


A PORTUGUESE EMBASSY TO JAPAN

(1644-1647)

TO MY FRIEND,
FRAZÃO DE VASCONCELLOS



NAGASAKI HARBOUR, AUGUST 15, 1647.

(See p. 27, note.)

A PORTUGUESE EMBASSY
TO
JAPAN (1644-1647)

TRANSLATED FROM AN UNPUBLISHED PORTUGUESE
MS., AND OTHER CONTEMPORARY SOURCES, WITH
COMMENTARY AND APPENDICES

BY
C. R. BOXER

*Socio da Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa e da Associação
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SKETCH OF NAGASKI HARBOUR ON AUGUST 15TH, 1647	<i>front</i>
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PREFACE

ALTHOUGH prefaces are seldom read, they are necessary in a work of this kind for the author to explain therein the "raison d'être" of his production. Moreover, discussions in the Press about the fate of the Bodleian, and caustic references to the enormous spate of printed matter—much of it of little or no value—which pours out yearly from the printing presses, impel me to offer some sort of an explanation for the infliction of yet another work on a long-suffering public.

This little work is not, of course, intended for the average reader, but will appeal only to those interested in the history of Japan or of early European intercourse with that country,—although I hope that if by any chance a copy of this book does fall into the hands of one of a wider public he will not find the adventurous narrative of this Embassy wholly uninteresting.

The chief reason for its publication is that it is almost entirely composed of documents which, if they were not published here, would in all probability never see the light of day at all, as they are collected from little-known colonial papers in Dutch and Portuguese archives.

The Portuguese document which forms the main part of this book is one of the "Livros das Monções" or "Books of the Monsoons" series now in course of publication by the Academia das Sciencias of Lisbon. As however, the publication of this series which began in 1880, has now (1928) only reached the year 1617, and is at present held up for lack of money,

it is obvious that if we were to wait for this present document of c. 1648 to be published in its proper sequence, its appearance might be deferred until the Greek Kalends. Furthermore, this series is issued without any notes and only a short introduction, so that I have taken the opportunity of adding additional information from Dutch and Japanese sources, whereby the original Portuguese account is corrected and supplemented to a considerable extent.

I do not pretend that this Embassy of 1647 was an epoch-making event in the history of Japan, or that it altered the whole course of the nation's development, although if it had been successful in its object it might well have done so. Interest in the history of early European intercourse with Japan is steadily increasing; and I trust that this modest addition to the erudite and monumental works of Father Schurhammer, S.J., Herr O. Nachod, and others, will not only shed some light upon a particularly obscure period of Japanese history, but will also do something towards redressing the present uneven balance between English and German scholarship in this particular sphere of historical research.

* * *

The translation of the MSS. may strike some readers as being somewhat clumsy in places, but I may plead in mitigation that it is not always easy even for a Portuguese to understand the exact meaning of some of the original passages. The copies of this series now extant were mostly written by some 18th century clerk in a hurried and careless fashion, and both grammar and punctuation are woefully deficient. I have tried as far as possible to give a rendering into 17th century English, and

I hope that if the result leaves something to be desired on the score of clearness, there is no doubt as to the accuracy of the translation.

The copy I have used is one of the "Lisbon Transcripts" series in the Record Department of the India Office at London, and was copied for that series by a Portuguese archivist in Lisbon in the last decade of the 19th century. It is not known who the author of the original was, but from several indications I infer that it was written or dictated by the Secretary of the Embassy, Duarte da Costa Homem, in 1648 or '49. It has never been printed before now, but it was obviously consulted by Father Cardim in Goa about 1650, as he made use of it in his "*Batalhas da Companhia de Jesus na sua gloriosa Provincia de Japão*," first published by Luciano Cordeiro in 1894, some sentences being identical in both works. The originals of the other sources used in the compilation of this essay are indicated in the text.

Mention is made elsewhere of those to whom my thanks are due for assistance rendered in various ways, but I should like to repeat here my deep sense of the obligation I am under to Senhor Frazão de Vasconcellos, for his courtesy in sending me transcripts of some of the original papers relating to the Embassy in the Lisbon archives. Thanks are also due to the Editor and Council of the Japan Society for permission to reprint this Essay from their "*Transactions and Proceedings*," Vol. XXV, 1927-8.

C. R. BOXER.

(1)

A PORTUGUESE EMBASSY TO
JAPAN, 1644—1647.

A PORTUGUESE EMBASSY TO JAPAN, 1644—1647

Translated from an unpublished Portuguese MS. and other contemporary sources, with commentary and appendices.

By C. R. BOXER.

INTRODUCTION.

"If by any chance whatsoever—from stress of weather or from any other cause—any Portuguese vessel put into a Japanese harbour, no matter where, all on board of her shall be put to death to the last man." So ran the concluding sentence of the Edict of August 2, 1640,* which decreed the final expulsion of the Portuguese from Japan, and that they were no idle words was clearly proved by the execution of the Lusitanian Emissaries from the city of Macau on the following day.

Nevertheless, despite the uncompromising severity of the terms of this edict, "finis" was not yet written to the eventful period (1542–1640) of Portuguese intercourse with Japan, and it is my purpose to trace in some detail the fate of the Embassy of 1647 which forms the epilogue to the "Christian Century." In this same year 1640 an event occurred in Europe which gave hope to the Portuguese of their being able to regain admittance to their lost Ophir. This was the successful revolution of December 1 which raised the Duke of Braganza to the throne of Portugal as Dom João IV and brought to an end the "sixty years' captivity" of Portugal to Spain. One of the first cares of the new king was to take measures to restore the Portuguese colonies in Asia and America to the prosperity they had

* I have used the version printed in Murdoch's *History of Japan*, Vol. II, p. 667. The edict had been actually signed on July 25, but it was not published until August 2.

enjoyed before the commencement of the Spanish domination in 1580, but to do this men and money were necessary, and Dom João had little enough of either.

Amongst the suggestions put forward for replenishing a depleted royal and colonial exchequer was that of securing a resumption of the rich Japan trade, whence had been derived those enormous profits which, prior to 1640, had been almost the sole support of the declining power of "Asia Portuguesa" against the ever-increasing encroachments of the Dutch. It was, however, one thing to suggest this and quite another to accomplish it, for it seemed as if the very stars in their courses fought against the Portuguese. Hard on their expulsion from Japan in 1640 had come the loss of Malacca to the Dutch in January, 1641, whilst in addition to wars with many native potentates in Asia and fighting a losing battle with the Hollanders in three quarters of the globe, the Portuguese were now perforce involved in a life-and-death struggle with the Spaniards at home.

The fact that, at a time when he had need elsewhere of every man and ship he could lay hands on, Dom João IV decided to send two galleons to convey an embassy to Japan, is a striking proof of the great value attached by the Portuguese to their former trade with that country. The preparations for this embassy began as early as 1642,* and it is probable that the arrival at Lisbon of Antonio Fialho Ferreira with a mission from Macau in 1643 strengthened the King and his ministers in their determination to proceed with their plan. This Macaonese mission, which was sent by that city to congratulate the King on his accession, brought with it substantial tokens of the city's loyalty in the shape of two hundred bronze cannon† and a sum of 200,000 taels in money, and in all probability was charged with urging upon the King the need of opening up the trade with Japan—the more so, since plague and the Tatar

* Information from Sr. Frazão de Vasconcellos, derived from the Lisbon Archives.

† Cast of copper imported from Japan. These guns were used in the Spanish war of 1640–1668, and some of them survived to be used by the Anglo-Portuguese artillery under Wellington at Badajoz!

invasion had ruined the Chinese commerce, whilst that with Manila had ceased in consequence of the war with Spain.

Be this as it may, preparations were hurried forward in the year 1643, and in December the galleons were ready and it only remained to choose an ambassador. Several names for this post were submitted by the "Conselho Ultramarino" (Overseas Council) to the King, who eventually selected Captain Gonçalo de Siqueira de Sousa,* a veteran of the wars in India and elsewhere, who had seen much service ashore and afloat against the English and Dutch, as well as against the Asiatic enemies of Portugal. The minutes of the meeting of the Conselho Ultramarino for December 9, 1643, make extremely interesting reading, but as a translation is given in Appendix E, it will be sufficient for the present to note that the Council advised the King to send the Embassy straight to Japan from Lisbon, calling only at Macau on the way—the reason for this being twofold, first, so that the Japanese should realise that it was a Royal Embassy from the King himself and not from the Viceroy of India, and secondly so that the Dutch should not get wind of it and forestall the Ambassador in Japan. This suggestion was adopted and the galleons accordingly set sail from Lisbon on February 5, 1644; but adverse winds and weather prevented them from carrying out their design of reaching Macau in the same year, and whilst the flagship was compelled to put in at Batavia† (where naturally the Dutch discovered the whole secret), her consort was wrecked on the east coast of India. As the further adventures of the galleons are related at length in the Narrative which follows, it is not necessary to repeat them here, and it will suffice to say that after refitting at Goa and after another abortive attempt the Ambassador at last anchored off Nagasaki on July 26, 1647.

Of what followed their arrival the Narrative of the Portuguese and the Dutch *Dagh-Register* of Nagasaki (see Appendix B) give full and interesting accounts and the

* See Appendix A.

† A ten years' truce between Holland and Portugal had been signed in 1641, but owing to wilful procrastination on the part of the Dutch this was not published in India until November, 1644.

reader is referred to them for details, but there is one point which is somewhat obscure and which it will be as well briefly to discuss here, namely, what part, if any, did the Dutch play in the rejection of the Embassy and how far were they responsible for its miscarriage? Tavernier,* of course, places the whole responsibility for the failure on the shoulders of the Dutch and alleges that the Resident at Nagasaki, Willem Versteegen, "played all the pranks he could, us'd all the contrivances imaginable" to frustrate the success of the Embassy; but Versteegen in his own Diary gives no hint of any such procedure. Naturally enough, the Dutch, although nominally at peace with Portugal, would leave no stone unturned to prevent the return of the Portuguese into the lucrative commerce with Japan; but whether they actually influenced the decision of the Japanese by means of bribes and promises, as Tavernier and other writers suggest, or whether, if they did so, these had any effect on the authorities, it is difficult to say. That they were *not* prepared to assist in the expulsion of the Portuguese by force of arms is conclusively shown by the entries in the *Dagh-Register* for August 19 and 21, 1647, and my own opinion is that the Dutch did not take any very definite steps to oppose the re-admittance of the Portuguese, because they probably knew that the attempt was foredoomed to failure in any case, in view of the inveterate and unchanging hostility to the Roman Catholic religion and its adherents which was still shown by the *Bakufu*.

In any event, it did not take the members of the *Rōjū* or Cabinet very long to make up their minds, for on August 29 there arrived two commissioners from the Court at Yedo, who brought with them a Decree which rejected the offers of the Portuguese, but allowed them to leave without further molestation. Thus, within eight years of the issue of the "immutable" Edict of 1640 prescribing the death of all Portuguese who came to Japan upon any excuse whatsoever, the Japanese themselves had allowed it to be violated. Whether this was due to a humane desire

* *Collection of Voyages*, 1684 edition, Book III, chap. I, p. 13. Tavernier was, however, grossly prejudiced against the Dutch.

on the part of the Japanese to avoid unnecessary bloodshed, or (as the Dutch would have us believe) out of fear of reprisals by the Portuguese if they attempted to destroy them, the reader may decide for himself. In all probability both considerations influenced the Japanese authorities, for if they had not been afraid of the Portuguese they would hardly have assembled some 50,000 men and hundreds of ships to deal with their two galleons; whilst, on the other hand, the dignified bearing and resolute demeanour preserved by the Ambassador in the face of so many dangers and his refusing to be disheartened by so many previous setbacks cannot have failed to impress the Japanese favourably.

But neither the calm courage of the Ambassador nor the dexterous and diplomatic shifts and evasions of his worthy Secretary succeeded in overcoming the innate fear and loathing of Christianity felt by the Japanese ever since the Shimabara Rebellion of 1637-8, and in face of this unflinching opposition the Embassy at last turned empty away.

In the preparation of this essay I have received much help and encouragement from the following, to whom I take this opportunity of acknowledging my thanks: To Mr. OTTIWELL of the India Office, for his courtesy in facilitating my researches amongst the Portuguese Records there; to Mr. VOORBEIJTEL CANNENBURG at Amsterdam, for allowing me the use of his comfortable office to work in during my stay in Holland; to Professor M. W. DE VISSER of Leiden, Holland, and to the Honorary Editor of the Japan Society, for help in identifying the Japanese names which occur in the text; to Kapitein-Luitenant ter Zee J. C. M. WARNSINCK and the authorities of the Rijksarchief in the Hague, for help with the Dutch Records; and above all to SR. FRAZÃO DE VASCONCELLOS, for the great trouble he has taken in sending me from Lisbon transcripts from the Portuguese Archives and biographical notes on the members of the Embassy. I have only to add that the translation of the Portuguese and Dutch documents given here is my sole work and I alone am responsible for any errors or mistakes which occur therein.

NARRATIVE OF THE EVENTS OF THE JOURNEY
THAT GONÇALO DE SIQUEIRA DE SOUSA MADE
TO JAPAN, AS AMBASSADOR TO THE KING OF THOSE
ISLANDS, SENT BY THE KING OUR LORD DOM JOÃO IV,
WHOM MAY GOD PRESERVE, IN JANUARY, 1644.

THE Kings of Portugal having always had for the end and object of the Conquest and Discovery of India the Conversion of Souls, this motive obliged them to great pledges of peoples and personages of that Kingdom and of its Royal Revenue; in whose imitation his Majesty the King our Lord Dom João IV, whom God preserve, knowing of the severance of the Friendship and Intercourse that had existed between the Portuguese and the Islands of Japan,—means by which so great a number of Souls had been guided to Heaven—determined to send an Ambassador to the King* of those Islands, as in effect he sent in January of '44 Gonçalo de Siqueira de Sousa† accompanied by two galleons, of the which, the *Almirante*‡ being ruined and laid up in Negapatam,§ the *Capitania*,‡ in which was the Ambassador went to winter in Jacatará,** and passing to Macau in the following year the Embassy could not be accomplished owing to the great Inconveniences urged by the *Moradores*†† of that City; and the Ambassador at the end of the same year returned to Goa, where he had recourse to the Viceroy

* *I.e.*, the Shōgun, who is intended wherever “King” or “Emperor” of Japan is mentioned in the text.

† See Appendix A.

‡ In Portuguese and Spanish fleets and squadrons of this period the flag-ship was always known as the *Capitania* and the second in command as the *Almirante*. In this case the former was the *Santo André*, the latter the *Santo Antonio de Aveiro*. They left Lisbon on February 5, 1644.

§ On the east or Coromandel coast of India. It was taken from the Portuguese by the Dutch in 1658.

** Or Batavia, the Dutch headquarters in the East Indies.

†† Townsmen or burghers.

of the State of India, Dom Felipe Mascarenhas,* in whom he found the effects of the most efficacious zeal for the Service of his Majesty, for that in a short space of time the galleon *São João* was fitted out, which was of greater size than the two that his Majesty had sent,† in which went the Ambassador together with the other that had arrived from Macau; they were despatched on the 30th of April, '46, provided with lusty soldiers and seamen, & ample artillery, with so much facility that he admired the readiness which the Viceroy displayed to fulfill this important enterprize so much to the Service of God and the King, contributing to such a result with considerable expences at a time when the State of India was in such need of them in several quarters. And because his Majesty had said that in Macau should be assigned a Secretary for the said Embassy, and since it would be highly inconvenient for a *Morador* of that City to occupy the Post by reason of the aversion that the Japanese had shown to it,‡ it appeared good to the Viceroy to send as Secretary Duarte da Costa Homem, a person of age and experience in matters of India, entrusting jointly as Captain and chief of the two galleons Antonio Cabral,* cavalleiro of the Order of Saint Iago, and [as second] Antonio de Gouvea della Valle,§ cavalleiro of the Order of Christ, persons well known for their continuous Services and Experience in matters of the Sea and of War.

The Ambassador left the Bar of Goa on the above-mentioned day, but owing to the Calmes and Contrary Winds experienced on the Voyage, he did not succeed in reaching Macau with the two galleons until the night of the 25th of July, and, by the express order given by the Viceroy, the Secretary of the Embassy disembarked forthwith on the following morning to negotiate with the members of the *Camara*** concerning some equipment which they had been unable to provide in Goa, both by reason of the shortness of the time and through ignorance of the particulars con.

* See Appendix A.

† See end of Appendix A.

‡ This refers to the execution of the Embassy of 1640.

§ See Addendum, p. 60. ** Municipal Council or Senate.

cern'd,—because for the rest the galleons had been given Pay for 4 months and supplied with all that was due to them.

The City behaved with diligence and liberality in supplying the necessary material and in the expences they disbursed for the decoration of the Ambassador's house and for his Suite; and the galleons left the Port of Macau on August 11th, on which, as it was late in the Season, their departure would have been impossible except for the contribution of so many diligencies; little, however, are these worth against the Divine Will and Disposition that it appears did not permit, for just reasons, that the Embassy might reach Japan that year, the galleons returning to Macau from the latitude of 28°,* forced by the contrary winds; and the hearts of those that were in them were filled with an extraordinary sorrow, in which they were joined by the whole City of Macau; this untoward incident of Fortune or better said of Divine Providence, gave rise to various opinions amongst the different sections of the people.

As by reason of the putting back to port no decision was come to, the City and people of Macau did not consent to the galleons returning to India that year, but the Captain with the Ambassador and the City sent an account of what had happened by a small vessel to the Viceroy, who, with reason, was greatly exercised, and from this resulted equal diligence, so that on the 7th of April, 1647, he despatched a *pataxo*† of assistance with 12,000 *patacas*‡ and abundant supply of all things necessary to the galleons of which they were at present lacking, and when it arrived at the Port of Macau on the 25th of June it found them ready to sail and equipped with all necessaries, which result was due to the great zeal of the Ambassador who had personally assisted at the repairing

* In the latitude of the Luchu ("Lequios") Islands to the south of Japan.

† A small vessel, usually with a single mast, corresponding to the English "pinnaces" of about 50-100 tons.

‡ A *pataca* was a small silver coin of varying value, and the same as the dollar or "piece of eight." See Yule, *Hobson-Jobson* (Dictionary of colloquial Anglo-Indian words and phrases), p. 683.

and caulking of the galleons, obliging with this example his inferiors to apply themselves to the work to so good an effect that there was hardly an individual who did not contribute to this reparation; and thus were jointly paid the Soldiers and Seamen, for which, as there was no money of the King, the Prelates and Clergy lent the Silver Plate of the Churches, with such a liberal resolve, that if help from India had not been forthcoming they would have wished to distribute and expend the silver; of those that gave an example, was the first in this offering Friar Manuel dos Anjos, prior of the Convent of S^o Augustin of Macau, ruler of its Bishoprick and Commissioner of the Holy Office. However, with the money that came as help, the Ambassador and Captain-General* gratefully sent to redeem this Silver, and the expenses were paid at the Cost of the Royal Exchequer.

Thus equipped, the Ambassador left for Japan at a more opportune time which was the 8th of July, and after a prosperous voyage arrived on the 26th of the same month off the Island of Horses† in sight of Nangasaque, a port of Japan, and immediately on arrival there came a small vessel of the kind they call *funem*,‡ and those that came in it asked what ships were they? who came in them? and what they wanted?

It was answered they were galleons of the King of Portugal, in which he had sent his Ambassador to the Emperor of Japan, and that it was close on four years since they had left the Kingdom, with which answer the vessel took its departure.

At eventide there came another vessel (I should say another *funem*) which brought 3 *Jurubacas*,§ who are interpreters, and underneath the awning were several persons of importance, these remaining hidden, and they asked if in truth there was an Ambassador of the King of Portugal,

* Luiz de Carvalho de Sousa (see Appendix A).

† "Ilha dos Cavallos," in Japanese Iō-jima 伊王嶋.

‡ *Fune* (actually a generic name for craft of any size).—EDITOR.

§ *Jurubaca*, *Jerubassa*, *Djouroubaca*, etc., "interpreter"; from the Malay *Juru-bahāsa*, "master of speech" (see *Hobson-Jobson*, 473-4).

and whether he came to treat of Commerce or of what? The Commander of the galleons answered that it was the Ambassador of the King Dom João IV of Portugal, and that the Secretary would speak to them.

The Secretary arriving at the side, he greeted the Jurubaças, and seeing that they kept a good distance from the galleon, & knowing that the oldest Jurubaça was one Antonio Carvalho who had formerly served the Portuguese (by what he had been previously told in the City of Macau), he said to him with a smiling countenance, "We can communicate better if you come nearer to us, come nearer! for I am not a Friar nor a Priest, neither are your Worships Preachers who speak from afar"—alluding to the prohibition* that there is in those Kingdoms against such; of this, what the Secretary said to them, they showed themselves content, as also did the persons who sat under the awning, and immediately they approached with great confidence, and the Secretary said to them that they could ask what they wished.

They said that they wished to know if there really was an Ambassador, and if he came to treat of matters of trade, to which the Secretary replied that there was an Ambassador, but that he had not come to treat of anything but the resumption of the friendship that formerly existed between the Kings of Portugal and the Emperors of Japan; with this they showed themselves satisfied, saying that the galleons could enter safely if they wished, and that they would not use force, nor had we need to suspect anything, forasmuch as the Japanese were very truthful in what they spoke. The Secretary answered that in this there was no doubt, because that besides having many good qualities, there were in them two in particular; the first was that of bravery, which they could not discuss now, the second being that they were reliable in their dealings. They showed themselves greatly pleased at this, and renewed their persuasions that the galleons might enter,† because matters of Importance could not be conducted at a distance,

* Iyemitsu's edict of 1636.

† "Will you walk into my parlour?" said the spider to the fly!

and that the Governor had ordered them to say so; to which the Secretary replied that the order that he brought did not allow him to enter, without first knowing if such was the will of the Emperor, and that they might make known to him the arrival of the Ambassador, and on receipt of his reply they would do as he directed; they said that he might launch the ship's boat, and that if he wished to send a person on land to speak with the Governor, they would take him, and in the same point they returned, saying that in the morning they would send a vessel in which he might come ashore.

And on the Secretary preparing to go, the Jurubaças excused themselves, giving it to be understood that they would not venture it, neither would they take to the Governor a letter that the Ambassador directed to him.

The next day the Jurubaças returned, asking to be informed as to the manner of the Restitution of the Kingdom of Portugal,* and as to what reason had induced his Majesty to send this Embassy; the Ambassador sent to answer them by the Secretary, who—they remaining in the *funem* without wishing to board the galleon—related to them at great length how it had all happened, and they acknowledged themselves satisfied, and still more so when he certified to them that the Embassy was not based on Commerce, but solely to make known to the Emperor of Japan from the King of Portugal how he had regained possession of his Kingdoms of Portugal and the Algarves and of all his Conquests, and to offer him his friendship and good will, and as the Japanese still suspected the Embassy to be based on trade, they asked other questions, which were answered so much to the point and they showed themselves so satisfied, that they took their departure much pleased and enlightened with what he had told them with so much detail.

* From 1580 to 1640 Portugal and Spain were governed by the same monarchs of the House of Habsburg, who ruled from Madrid and treated Portugal as a mere dependency of Spain. On December 1, 1640, the Portuguese rose in revolt and placed the rightful claimant, the Duque de Braganza, on the throne as Dom João IV, but war with Spain dragged on until 1668.

On the following day the Jurubaças returned and said that they wished to speak with the Secretary, and arriving on board, the oldest of them said to him that he had informed the Governor with truth, or rather with great exactness, of all that the Secretary had told him on the previous day, with which he remained very satisfied, and that thus he had ordered him to say that we might enter [the harbour], because negotiations cannot be conducted at a distance, and that we could do so on his word, for he on his side placed faith on that of the Embassy, forasmuch also as the Governor had powers from the Emperor, and what he ordered was done, and he ruled all the foreign nations that came to Nagasaki, hence he assured the Security of their entry, but not the reply that might come from the *Tenca** (which in our understanding corresponds with the Council of State), and should we not enter, we could not expect the reply that we pretended to.

The Ambassador, in view of the reply of the Governor of Nagasaki, and reflecting how important it was that the Embassy,—in whose fate his Majesty and the State of India were so much concern'd—should be carried forward, and that it would be impossible to accomplish it without entering the harbour, decided to do so.

This was a resolution judged by many to be more bold than safe, and with it agreed the Commander of the galleons Antonio Cabral, and the Secretary and the others were of the same opinion, forasmuch as the Japanese showed themselves to be generous-minded and true, and it was not expedient to waste such considerable expences on the part of his Majesty and the Viceroy by returning without answer, and that they must needs solicit this under any risk, making little account of Life considering the glory that would result from so courageous an action in which the vassals of his Majesty would enhance that credit that they always had with foreign nations; and the Ambassador at once sent to the Governor to inform him that relying on his word he

* Presumably the *Rōjū* (Great Council) is meant. On the *Rōjū* and its functions see Murdoch's *History of Japan*, Vol. III, chap. I, pp. 4-9 (esp. p. 8, note 1).

would enter the port, so soon as a breeze from the sea should arise, and accordingly the galleons entered and cast anchor near the City after first firing their salute of Artillery.

When the galleons were entering, the Jurubaças made notable persuasions to induce them to anchor within a creek, which it appears they did by order of the Governor; however, the Pilot was experienced in the Seas of Japan, and as it did not appear to him to be safe to listen to them, he shouted that in no case would he enter except by mid-channel, which was done, but much against the will of the Jurubaças, which, as was subsequently experienced, was of damnable intent.

Soon the Jurubaças came from the City, saying that the Governor was sending two *fidalgos* [gentlemen*], his Secretaries, to visit the Ambassador, and they came to advise him of this and immediately returned to the City; with all possible dispatch, the gallery of the galleon was decorated with the hangings that had been brought for the purpose; carpets were laid down, and chairs with embroidered velvet (and another of different embroidery for the Ambassador) were placed at the head together with other gorgeous fittings; at this moment the Jurubaças arrived, saying that they wished to see the place and reception that the Ambassador was preparing for the gentlemen who were coming just behind, and being fully informed they came on board, and just after them, the Secretaries who were now arriving.

The Commander of the galleons, the Secretary, and other persons, went to receive them, accompanying them to the gallery, where the Ambassador received them within the partition, telling them to be seated, whilst the Jurubaças and our people seated themselves on the carpets, and the Commander of the galleons and the Secretary on the divans.

After the Secretaries had greeted the Ambassador, the eldest of them bade him welcome on behalf of the Governor;

* *I.e., samurai.* They were probably of *bugiō* rank (*Machi-bugiō*?). Wherever "Secretaries" (in the plural) are referred to in the text, these *bugiō* are meant and must be carefully distinguished from the "Jurubaças" or interpreters, who were of lower rank.

the Ambassador acknowledging this courtesy, replied to him with equal Politeness, asking in the first place after the health of the Emperor and of all the Royal Family; disconcerted by this question, they answered, after a long pause, that "the Emperor was in good health and that all his Court and Kingdoms were at peace."

The news was celebrated by a salvo of artillery which the Commander of the galleons had arranged; the Secretaries were disturbed by the sound of it and begged them not to continue the salute, four pieces having been discharged, on which they were told that it was customary with us to celebrate good news in that manner, and that they were in honour of the good health of the Emperor, and that the salute would be of nine pieces; and in truth there were not wanting some who were disquieted and disconcerted at the manifestation, the alarm being further increased by the Governor's sending to know the meaning of this thing. A Servant entered the gallery with this message, looking greatly alarmed, but he was pacified on being told by the Secretaries the reason of the Salvo; but in the same way, amongst our people, there arose uneasiness owing to the perturbation of the spirit of the Governor, but without the Japanese noting any manifestation of their distrust.

This brief uneasiness having passed, the Secretaries continued to ask on behalf of the Governor whether the Embassy was from the King of Portugal, and if it was founded on trade, or what was the object of sending it? forasmuch as the neighbouring Kings—like that of China—did not usually send Embassies except in case of some cause for congratulation.

For the better understanding* of what is written and the knowledge of what is customary among the Japanese in general, and in what concerns the Emperor in particular, who is seldom seen by his vassals who live outside the palace, and when he does permit it, they have to keep at such a distance that he can barely be distinguished, and this custom

* The following remarks on Japanese customs by the Portuguese Secretary were of course founded on hearsay and must not be taken too literally.

is used in its entirety by all the great Lords who likewise never speak themselves but always answer through their Secretaries, and [furthermore] because our Secretary who was curious and desirous of being correct in everything, was well enough informed of all this when the Secretaries asked the Governor the above question[s] he did not agree to the Ambassador replying to them, but for more authority and respect he himself always did so, with such skill and brevity that the Japanese wondered at it: Taking his hand to reply and making the due courtesy to the Ambassador, he asked him permission to give it, saying to the Jurubaças that they should be already informed of it from what he had said to them concerning this matter at the Island dos Cavallos, and that they might always rest assured that he would answer them with all truth, to which they said that they had already perceived as much, but that these other gentlemen, being Secretaries [*i.e.*, *bugiō*] as they were, would esteem it highly if the Ambassador would tell them with his own mouth the manner of the Restitution of the Kingdom of Portugal, and the reasons that had obliged the King to send an Embassy, and the object thereof.

The Ambassador related to them at considerable length all that the Secretary had already told them with such fidelity; it is certain that the Japanese remained satisfied of the scrupulousness of our speaking, nevertheless as men of scant courtesy they said that they were satisfied but asked that the Ambassador might repeat what he had already said, which he did, and with which they were satisfied. In order that the Japanese might be more fully informed of the Embassy, the Ambassador showed them the instructions that he carried; the Secretaries took them ashore, for which purpose it was entrusted to them with great confidence, as it was a part of the singular judgement of the Viceroy Dom Felipe Mascarenhas, who as one so experienced in making the best terms, had amended the defects in the rescripts which had been made out in Portugal, occasioned by information wrongly considered, which so easily perverts affairs of great importance, and raises objections in the most polished writings; the Jurubaças, receiving it, said that it was necessary to draw up a memorial to the

Governor, to which the Secretary objected, as he judged this to be inconvenient, but as those of the City of Macau had said to him that he should let himself be guided in all things by the Jurubaças,* he said that it would be done immediately, and it was done as follows:—

Sir Governor,

As Ambassador of the King of Portugal Dom João IV, I, Gonçalo de Siqueira de Sousa, make known to your Worship that I departed from the Kingdom of Portugal as Ambassador to the great and powerful Emperor of Japan, with express order not to return to the said Kingdom without an answer to the Embassy, even if in so doing I should spend many years, and whereas it is nearly four since I left the Kingdom with 2 galleons, and on the voyage one was wrecked with the loss of nearly all on board, and with the other I arrived at Jacatará with very few people and those sick, whence the Dutch gave me a Pilot and some people† for the monsoon with which I was able to come to Macau, which is the nearest land we possess, and from thence I returned to Goa in order that the Viceroy should furnish me with 2 galleons, which he did; and I continued my voyage which was a very long one, and touched at Macau in order to obtain an experienced Pilot, forasmuch as the one I brought from India was not skilled in this journey, and thus I left with 2 galleons on the 11th of August last year, when on arriving at the latitude of the Lequios in 28°, I encountered a great typhoon of contrary winds which lasted many days and obliged me to return to Macau, having suffered in the whole course of this voyage two winterings and one wreck, and as soon as it was convenient I advised the Viceroy of India of what had occurred, in order that he

* This, of course, was a great mistake. Times had changed since 1639, and the interpreters—even those like the Antonio Carvalho (see p. 11) who had then served the Portuguese—were no longer able to, or would not dare to, favour the interests of the foreigners. On the Interpreters, see Murdoch, Vol. III, p. 282ff.

† On the trouble caused by the loan of a Dutch pilot and some sailors to the Portuguese Embassy see Murdoch III, chap. VIII, p. 270, and Nachod, *Beziehungen von der Nederl. Ostind. Komp. zu Japan im 17. Jahrht.*, pp. 318-9.

should send me some galliots and necessary things for the galleons, and they being arrived, I sought to continue the voyage to Japan, and having lost some men through death and others marrying, and some being taken ill, I was forced for the Service of the galleons to draw some youths from Macau, as also a Pilot skilled in the Japan voyage, and with leave from your Worship I entered into this Port of Nagasaki, and I ask your Worship as Governor of the same, and for the Service of the Great Emperor to make known to him with all despatch what is related here, in order that I may take the letter to him which I bring from the King Dom João IV, and with the good information of your Worship, I await the reply which can always be expected from so great and powerful a Prince.

In this Flagship, 4th August, 1647.

GONÇALO DE SIQUEIRA DE SOUSA.

On the following day* the Jurubaças came saying that the Secretaries were following, who having entered into the gallery said that the Governor sent to say that it was customary in this port of Nagasaki for all foreign vessels to remove rudders, artillery and arms, and therefore this must be done; the Secretary replied saying that he did not doubt that such might be the custom, but nevertheless it could not be held to include galleons of war (or rather which were of war) which brought Foot-soldiers accompanying the Embassy and therefore were exempted from doing what the Governor ordered; to which they answered in a somewhat weary tone, that they did not know whether it might not later turn out to our prejudice if we did not obey the orders of the Governor as the person who ruled over all Foreigners, to which the Secretary disagreed, saying that no evil could possibly come to us from not doing what

* August 5. According to the contemporary "Dagh-Register" of the Dutch factory at Deshima, this demand of the Japanese for the surrender of the galleons' arms and rudders was made on July 28 and repeated on August 1, being rejected on each occasion by the Portuguese (see Appendix B).

Goncalo de S. Sequeira

THE AMBASSADOR'S SIGNATURE.

(Copied from the original in the Portuguese Archives.)

was inadvisable: The Ambassador told the Secretaries that if the Embassy should be received, he would undoubtedly withdraw the rudders and artillery from the galleons, and even order the masts to be removed, but that so long as it was not received, by no means would he agree to it, and with this answer the Secretaries returned displeased.

And on the same day about 2 o'clock the Secretaries returned saying that the Governor sent a warning to the Ambassador to withdraw the artillery and the Helms and the Arms, as it was customary, even with regard to Ambassadors; to which the Secretary replied that the Ambassadors referred to must have been from the Kings of Tonquin or Cochin-China, and that such Kings were petty chiefs in comparison with the King of Portugal,* and that likewise those vessels came also to trade, but that neither the galleons of so sovereign a King as that of Portugal, nor his Ambassador which came in them, could be subjected to such an indignity; and that so prudent a Governor could not fail to see the force of these reasons, besides many others that the Ambassador omitted.

And in view of the continuation of the two disputes they had had with the Secretaries over the matter of the Arms, and there being every likelihood of their continuing, the Ambassador being informed that our people were discontented with what had transpired in regard to the delivery of the arms, he summoned on deck the officers of the galleons, and other persons, and explained to them what he had answered, to which they all unanimously declared that the presence of arms inspired respect at all times, and that this respect would be lost so soon as they were delivered up.†

* A shrewd thrust on the part of the Ambassador. In point of fact, with the exception of the Dutch embassies, Japanese diplomatic intercourse *was* confined to petty rulers of this description, Siam in particular often sending envoys.

† This was well reasoned. The Japanese, as a warlike and chivalrous nation, would no doubt have fully appreciated the argument of the Ambassador. There can be little question that the readiness with which the Dutch yielded up their arms and accoutrements on arrival at Nagasaki did much to lower them

A third time in the same day did the Secretaries return, saying that the Dutch used to do the same; the Secretary rejoined that *they* could certainly do it without discredit, because their ships were merchant vessels which came for purposes of trade, but that galleons of war in which came the Ambassador of so potent a monarch to treat solely of friendship and benevolence, could on no account whatever be subjected to such an Indignity: and so the Secretaries resorted to two *Memoranda*, or proposals, which they brought by authority from the Governor; the first alleged that the Ambassador, in not fulfilling what was ordered, had acted contrary to the Rescript of his Majesty, to which the Secretary rejoined that he would like to know in what way; they then said that the King of Portugal said that when the Ambassador should speak with the Emperor he could promise him that he would order and command his Vassals in all things to serve and obey their *Faxéques*,* and therefore, in view of this, the Ambassador incurred blame in not doing so. The Secretary replied that by this same clause the Ambassador was not bound to do this, and he was much astonished that their Worships should interpret things so out of the way, because the Clause states that the Ambassador, when he should speak with the Emperor, he might promise him what has been stated, but it does not say that the Ambassador would do what the Governor of Nagasaki should order him, for between him and the person of the Emperor there was a great difference; and on the Secretaries seeing that their proposition was quashed, they went on to the second, saying that when the Governor sent them to welcome him, he [*i.e.*, the Ambassador] had replied that now he had entered, he would remain at his orders, as Governor that he was of that City, and therefore for this reason he had no excuse to give for not withdrawing the helm, artillery and arms, and that in neglecting to do this

in the eyes of the Japanese, and was the reason for much of the scant courtesy with which they were not infrequently treated by the minor officials of Nagasaki.

* "Rulers" or "overlords." This Portuguese word represents some Japanese title, which I have not been able to identify.

he had no satisfaction to give for what he had said, nevertheless it was to be understood that it was said by way of courtesy in acknowledging the visit of the Governor, saying that he would do as he was bidden, always presupposing it would be in lawful matters, but as this was to the detriment of his own credit and repute of the office he represented, by no means was he compelled to do as he was ordered, and that their Worships were prudent enough to see the force of his reasoning; and because they understood to be true what he had told them, they showed themselves notably discontented, and then the Secretary bade them bring the Rescript, which they had retained for so many days, and [said] that the Ambassador would confer with the Captains upon it, and he would be pleased to find something in it by which he could give pleasure to the Governor without sullyng the charge he held; and the Secretaries, saying they would do so, proceeded to embark at once.

The Jurubaças came on the following day, and in conversation with the Secretary they stated to him that they had come for an answer about the Artillery the case being that they had brought the rescript as agreed, in order that the Ambassador should form the Junta he had spoken of; and seeing this bad turn,* the Secretary told them he was astonished at it, but that it must have been due to old age, and that he would give a reply to the Deed so soon as it arrived, to which he [*i.e.*, the oldest Jurubaça] deferred, asking his pardon, and they acknowledged that it was very right, and said they would give account to the Governor.†

And the oldest Jurubaça, returning the next day, said "The Sr. Governor bids me ask your Worship how you fare with these calms"; the Secretary replied, thanking his Worship for the Courtesy of his Enquiries and said that those who dwelt under his Shadow could not but fare well

* *I.e.*, that the bluff of the Portuguese had been called!

† It is difficult to follow this, but equally so to give another rendering of the last three lines of the original Portuguese—"mas que devia ser descuido de velhice, que assim como o papel viesse se responderia logo, ao que elle differio que lhe perdoasse, e que tinha muita razão, e que dariam conta ao governador."

under any circumstance; he also spoke to them of the dinghy which was required to raise the anchor, which boat they had taken to land at the time when the galleons were anchored;* they pretended not to understand and never returned it until the galleons were actually leaving; and forasmuch as it was becoming apparent that the spirit of the Governor was not well inclined towards us, the Commander of the galleons with renewed vigilance and care ordered some preventive measures to be taken† against Evils which it was feared might occur at any moment.

It is noteworthy that as this Embassy met with so many mishaps before it arrived, the Japanese had ample time since the previous year to prepare themselves for burning the galleons, as was certainly realised when they were entering, because [otherwise] within the space of so few days it would have been impossible to assemble a tenth part of the shipping which was collected, our men daily witnessing the conveyance of materials for fireworks, whilst we patiently awaited the resolution of the Answer, forasmuch as to depart without it would not have conformed to the reputation of the Portuguese.

The Ambassador realising that the preparations that were made were not for festivities of Joy, and seeing that the crew were considerably perturbed, summoned them on deck and told them that it was nearly four years since they had left the Kingdom, during which many trials had been undergone, solely for the purpose of obtaining a result, and that now they were waiting for it, let them show in their countenance what the feeling was which they should

* See the *Dagh-Register* of the Dutch Factory for July 29, on which date the boat was seized (Appendix B).

† “Serviu o aviso para que houvesse dobrada vigia nos galeões, e alegria em todos, tangendo e cantando principalmente de noite, com que os japões se admiravam.” (“This warning caused redoubled watch to be kept in the galleons and likewise inspired joy in all the crew, who frequently sang and danced during the nights, to the admiration of the Japanese”)—Father Cardim's account in Cordeiro's *Batalhas da Companhia de Jesus na sua gloriosa Província do Japão*, p. 53. (See Bibliography following the paper.)

have at heart, which was that of being ready to offer a thousand lives in the service of God and the King; to which they all answered suitably—as being content—that time would show how each one desired to do his Duty; the Ambassador rejoined that through dire peril were acquired the glories and honours of the World, and their only regret should be that they had not many lives to give for the King of Heaven, and for him of Portugal, and the further away they might be, the greater their obligation to act thus, more especially in the sight of so many enemies of our Holy Faith, for it was well they* should say that they found us calm and serene under any event; each one, however, must mind what was placed to his lot to do, and to those who on the occasion should distinguish themselves most, he promised favours and rewards in the name of his Majesty, and with this speech they were satisfied.

The Emperor of Japan having been falsely informed by certain persons, enemies of our Holy Faith, that it was the custom of the King of Portugal when he desired to take some Kingdom, to introduce into it Religious,† and that he wished to take Japan by the same means, it was decreed that none of his Vassals should navigate, no matter to what country it might be, and [he] sent to populate desert wastes by the seashore, solely that in no place should the Religious be able to land, and, furthermore—not trusting any Nation—on board of each ship that came in, a watch was placed, which never left it, for it has happened that Religious were smuggled into Japan; and so that none should be stowed away, many singular means have been resorted to, some in the shape of rewards to such as would discover them, and

* *I.e.*, the Japanese.

† This was the old story (not altogether false) founded on the remarks of the Spanish pilot of the *San Felipe* in 1596 and subsequently re-affirmed by Will Adams and the English and the Dutch enemies of the Iberian Kingdom. In justice to the Portuguese, however, it should be stated that it applied more to the Spaniards, who at one period undoubtedly considered the prospect of conquering Japan from the Philippines. Compare *Trans. As. Soc. Jap.*, Vol. XVII, Pt. II.

others of punishments to those who should hide them,* and therefore it will be impossible to pass any Religious to that Kingdom without the certainty that they will be made prisoners at once, by the means that have been marked out for this end: when the galleons were anchored at the Ilha dos Cavallos, it was a very remarkable thing to see the numerous watches that they placed over them, and fires by night, suspecting that some Religious might come ashore, and thus when the two Secretaries came on behalf of the Governor to visit the Ambassador they asked him if they might post a guardship over them, which was conceded, however they placed two, one at the prow and the other at the poop, and from what was found out by our men they had on board these guardships some men who spoke our language fairly well,† and so oppressed were we, that in truth we suffered grievance.

On August 3rd the Jurubaças came with the Secretaries, and told the Ambassador that the Governor said that of all that had passed, and of the Rescript that had been shown him, he had written an account to the Governors of the *Tenca*, and they put to him a question which was rather embarrassing to answer, namely: Let the Secretary state whether when the King of Portugal despatched this Embassy, the Sentence of Death was known which the Emperor had commanded be passed on the Ambassadors from Macau, and all the rest of their suite, and that the ship in which they came was burnt, and that no more Portuguese were ever

* For the texts of the various edicts of 1587, 1611 and 1635, offering rewards for the discovery of fugitive priests and penalties for those who should help them, see Woolley, *Historical Notes on Nagasaki* (in *Trans. As. Soc. Jap.*, Vol. IX, pp. 135-6) and Nagayama, *Roman Catholic Religion in Japan*; also Nagaoka, *Histoire des Relations du Japon avec l'Europe aux XVI^e et XVII^e siècles*, pp. 95, 115, 119-21, 137-41, the works of Murdoch, Pagés and Charlevoix, Kaempfer, etc., *passim*.

† Up to this period, and even later, Portuguese was the commercial *lingua franca* of the Far East, and up to 1630 even the Dutch and English used it as the medium of their dealings with the natives. At this time there must have been many Japanese (besides the Jurubaças) who still retained a knowledge of it, as the expulsion of the Portuguese in 1639 was only seven years past.

to return upon Pain of Death?*

To this question the Secretary answered that it was not known, and the old Jurubaça rejoined that some men of the galleon had told him that it *was* known; the Secretary replied saying that "in these matters, as well as in all others that might be mentioned, I alone can give the true version, for many reasons which I need not point out,"—thus in Portugal it was rumoured that in Japan some men had been put to death, and as such things were of frequent occurrence no one had asked for details, besides which it was said that these were common people, however neither by the King of Portugal nor in Lisbon was this thing spoken about, nor was it known for certain what it was, nor how it was, nor the reason for which the Emperor had ordered such a Martyrdom.†

The Jurubaças interpreted these reasons to the Secretaries, who showed themselves partly satisfied, but not altogether so, for the aim of the Governor was to demonstrate that whereas in Portugal the Sentence was known, yet this Embassy had come thence with the Condemnation of Death upon it,—however the Secretary had refuted the Proposition, and to make it clearer still he added the following:—That the events of the Kingdom of Portugal were so varied, and succeeded each other so rapidly, that it was not possible to learn the certainty of them with great speed; so much so, that when Malacca—which was a fortress of great import to Portugal—was lost,‡ it was a long time before the news of it was known for certain, by reason of the great distance

* See Murdoch, Vol. II, chap. 23, pp. 664–8, for a good summary of the missionary accounts of the tragedy of 1640.

† This was quite untrue. The fate of the Macau Embassy of 1640, and the execution of the four ambassadors with fifty-seven of their suite, was well known in Portugal and was a subject of universal discussion amongst all classes of society. Furthermore, in 1643 there had been published in Lisbon a full and detailed narrative of the Embassy under the title of *Relação da gloriosa morte de quatro embaixadores portuguezes da Cidade de Macau, com cinquenta e sete dos seus companheiros degolados pela fé em Nangasqui, a 3 de agosto de 1640*, by Lourenço de Anvers, 4to, 24 fol.

‡ In January, 1641.

away it was situated,—how much more then would not this apply to Macau, which was still more distant? This reply was delivered by the Jurubaças to the Secretaries, who declared they were satisfied with the reason and they would say as much to the Governor: these people daily employed many subtle questions and subterfuges in order to see whether we would reply in a different manner from that we had employed at first.

The Secretaries used much importunity to have the Letter of Credence given them to shew to the Governor,—judging that it would be done as easily as the Rescript was given them,—but the Secretary told them that the Ambassador could not do this for many reasons, the principal one being that the letter is the Credit and Surety of the Person who is sent, and must not be shewn to any but the one to whom it is sent, therefore under no circumstances could he part with it, save only when he should deliver it into the hands of the Emperor, and this matter was so confidential and of such respect that although he himself carried the key of the casket in which it came, he had never opened it, nor had the Secretary read it; and when the Japanese saw his resolution they at once departed.

On the 5th of August the Jurubaças came in the Evening and said they wished to speak with the Secretary, and arriving on board, one of them said that the Sr. Governor warned us that it often happened in the City that houses caught fire, and should any tumult occur there was no need for us to be alarmed, and furthermore it might so happen that some sparks might fall into the galleons and take fire, in which case the Governor would take care to send out some vessels to save the crews and carry them ashore: to which the Secretary replied thanking his Worship for the warning, and said that it was indeed a common occurrence for houses to catch fire, but that it was impossible that from so far sparks could fall into the galleons, and even if such did happen his Worship might be quite certain that there would not be wanting willing hands to extinguish the fire at once; with this reply the Jurubaças were fain to depart, and they showed themselves astonished at the resolution implied in the answer to this Message.

At daybreak on the Feast-day of Our Lady of the Assumption [August 15] there appeared before us a bridge of boats which closed the entrance of the harbour, but which our people perceived was not altogether strong, and that with the favourable wind we might force our way out, as several of our men desired; to which the Ambassador replied with a stern and resolute demeanour, that in no wise would he do so, for in the same way as it was thought proper to enter, under no duress would he leave.

He said that he quite realised that the chief persons would deem his resolve a prudent one, and further pointed out that should they spread their sails it must necessarily follow that a large number of the assembled vessels would come out and attack the galleons, or at least prevent them from breaking through the bridge of boats which had been formed, which could not be attempted without grave risk, and that such of the Japanese as were on the bridge would perforce defend it, and that the issue of a fight frequently turned out to be far otherwise than had been anticipated, and finally, the fact of our leaving would give the Japanese reason to say that we were opening hostilities, a thing which was by no means expedient in any case, nor for the Dutch, who were within sight,* to say that the Ambassador of

King of Portugal had fled as a fugitive,—hence [in view of all these considerations] it behoved us to await the decision of the Court, which was hourly expected; in order, likewise, to learn the reason for this wanton display of aggression, he hoisted a white flag as a signal to the Jurubaças to come, and on their arrival he asked them the reason for this novelty—or rather making the bridge—for if it was to inspire fear, let them be assured that

* See Plate I (reproduced from Nagayama's work described in the Bibliography following the paper), where three Dutch ships are shown at anchor off Deshima. These three vessels are the *Joncker*, *Berckhout*, and *Campan*. The Dutch *opperhoofd* or chief of the Deshima Factory was Willem Versteegen, in whose unpublished diary (see Appendix B) is to be found a long and interesting narrative of this Embassy and other events during this year in Japan.

the Ambassador felt none, not even if further preparations should be made.

The Jurubaças returned saying that the Secretaries were following as they wished to speak with the Ambassador, and these, coming on board, said that the Governor sent word to say that he had had the bridge built merely for his own security, by reason of his having written to the Court of the Ambassador's arrival, and because the *funés* on watch had advised that there was a rattling of cables on board the galleon, and other matters, and that it was not to his credit that the Ambassador should leave without a reply, because it would be imputed to him as a fault.

To this the Ambassador answered with dignity that he relied on the promise given at his entry, and that for himself, it would have been the same if the Governor had posted a small *funé* at the entrance of the harbour instead of stopping it up with mountains, since it was not to his own credit to leave without an answer, and as regards the rattling of the Cables this was to veer round the galleon at the various changes of the wind.

On the day of Our Lady of the Assumption at early dawn, as has been said, there appeared the bridge completed, and we besieged,—each line of the *funés* consisting of near upon a hundred (and these were three lines deep), over which they had formed 3 rows of planks, each row being capable of carrying five persons [abreast?]; the bridge itself was most strongly built with good beams bound with iron and cables, and was provided with stores of food; on this bridge they erected 10 castles,* four of 3 floors [=stories] which were provided with pieces of artillery, the other six being lower but provided with many engines supposed to be of fire, and for the greater fortification of the bridge they posted two lines of vessels of such size that each one required thirty rowers on each side to man them, being provided with bulwarks so high as to cover the oarsmen, all of whom carried arms; each of the vessels carried over eighty persons in addition to the[ir] crew[s], whilst each

* "Castello" in the text. Bastions or bulwarks, three or four stories high in some cases, would be more accurate.

row of vessels numbered 100; the other row, being composed of small vessels, must have comprised 150 craft, and likewise the flotilla of ships at the bridge alone—which carried the soldiery afore-mentioned—must have numbered over 500 vessels,* in addition to which there were eight others equipped with infernal machines and artifices for fire within their mantelets,† besides crowds of men, who were probably for boarding purposes, since there were many limber-holes‡ and who remained half-concealed waiting for what should befall.

This bridge closed the entrance of the bar, which is situated between the bottom of two mountains;§ at the foot of the end one on the South side they had built, at high-water mark, a platform mounted with 10 pieces [of artillery] of about 6 lbs: calibre, an embrasure above having 8 more; on the other side they had also some cannon which through the telescope seemed more in number; the chief strength was on the East side, by which the exit would be effected, for which purpose there was opened a passage, but so narrow that the galleons would barely be able to pass through, and even so, it was only three fathoms deep, so that it was a mercy of God to have delivered us

* It looks as if the writer has got a trifle mixed in his figures. He has just stated that there were *two* rows of "*funés*" posted at the bridge (in addition to those actually *forming* the bridge) totalling 250 craft. He probably includes all the vessels in the vicinity of the bridge as well as those actually guarding it. Valentyn in his account (see Appendix C) places the Daimiō of Hakata's (Chikuzen-no-kami) forces *alone* at 60,000 men, but this is a palpable exaggeration. The evidently unprejudiced and detailed Japanese account quoted by Woolley (Appendix D) gives a total strength (of all Daimiōs) of 30,433 soldiers and 19,795 sailors, or some 50,200 men in all, and this agrees well enough with the Portuguese version. In any case the force assembled to deal with the two galleons and their 400 men bears comparison with the numbers engaged on both sides at Sekigahara (100,000) in 1600 and the Shimabara rebellion (140,000) in 1637-8.

† See Oman's *Art of War in the Middle Ages*.

‡ Holes through the floor-timbers on each side of the keelson, to allow the passage of bilge-water.

§ Called Ogami and Megami.

from this risk, which appears to have been constructed solely in order to lure us on, and indeed we could not help dreading some catastrophe in view of what they were planning against us, and against which the galleons were preparing themselves in the best manner they could; some of our people volunteered to fire the bridge, but the Ambassador would not consent, since it was not his intention to leave without an answer.*

From the bridge to the City, within every creek and inlet formed by the mountains, many vessels had been placed, and only of such as had artifices and mantelets and grappling-irons there were counted over 400; there were also upwards of 300 light craft, and in the City itself we could see the beach full of large ships but they were not provided with castles or mantelets; these came out to join the others, and those which were on either side of the bay ostentatiously formed themselves into squadrons, being discernable by the devices they bore of the various Lords who had sent them.†

At the time when the galleons entered this Port some of the experienced seafarers, who had been constrained to come,‡ remarked unusual actions on land, such as the placing of look-outs on the tops of the mountains, and at the entrance where the bridge had been formed hutments had been constructed on both sides of the Bay, and it was found out that these had been erected solely for the purpose of housing the machines and shipping which they had intended to assemble in order to await the Embassy, of which they

* Compare Cardim's account: "*Os Officiaes dos galeões valentes e animosos se offereceram para pôr fogo á ponte, mas o embaixador não quiz sair para fóra sem resposta,*" etc. ("The officers of the galleons boldly and courageously volunteered to set fire to the bridge, but the A. did not consent, since he was resolved not to leave without an answer").

† All these details are fully borne out by the wonderfully interesting contemporary Japanese painting reproduced in Plate II. On this will be found written the names of the various Daimiō present, the sites of the artillery and ships, etc., etc.

‡ "Constrained": this seems to mean they had been taken on board at Macau (see p. 18), whence, in consequence of the tragedy of 1640, men would not willingly have come.

had received news through the Dutch,*—for it would not have been possible for the Japanese to have mustered over 2,000 vessels within a few brief days, if it had not been that for a twelvemonth previously all the coastal Daimios had been warned to prepare themselves; and this opinion was certainly correct, because many of the craft were but newly launched from the Dockyards.

All persons who had any experience of the affairs of Japan, thoroughly understood that the galleons ran a great risk, forasmuch as the Sentence [of Death] had been given, and the Dutch when the galleons had touched at Malacca, told them so, since they had received news to that effect from Japan, and the Dutch Captain† remarked to the Commander of the galleons that he regretted they should undertake this voyage for it was most certain that they would lose their lives, to which he replied that even so they could desire nothing better if it was to be in the service of God and the King, and likewise in Macau disinterested persons said and understood the same,—nevertheless this was not put to the men in such terms as they could understand it;‡ and by the vessels which came from the Kingdom of Tonquin it was known from the Japanese who resided there, and from the Chinese who had arrived from Japan that the galleons were expected at this latter place, and they were ready to burn them, whilst the officers of the City of Macau had sufficient information of all this, but they prudently kept it to themselves.§

* Quite correct, as is proved by the following extract from the *Deshima Dagh-Register* for August, 1646:—"On the 28th it was announced that two Portuguese galleons were expected to appear with Ambassadors from Goa." (Valentyn, V, p. 88.)

† Arnold de Vlaming van Oudtshoorn (compare my article in Vol. XXIV, p. 34, note).

‡ This was rather naïve. No educated, or uneducated, Portuguese of that period could fail to have heard of the events of 1639 and 1640 and the fate that awaited any Portuguese or Spaniards who went to Japan in defiance of the edicts of 1639, though doubtless their officers managed to explain some of it away.

§ This was crossed out in the original, but copied in full by the scribe of the India Office copy. (Compare Bibliography, first entry.)

From the messages which the Governor of Nagasaki had forwarded to our people when they were anchored off the island of Cavallos, and from the great importunity with which they tried to persuade us to enter, our men began to realise the great risk they were running and that there was no other hope than what the benefit of delay should bring; and no less were they persuaded of this by the sight of the multitude of vessels that day by day were assembled together, and by the messages sent by the Governor himself that we need not be troubled at the sight, because it was customary for them to resort in large numbers to that port, whilst any foreigners were there, for the purpose of buying and selling, whereas it was well known to us that this was prohibited—all these demonstrations indicated clearly enough the drastic nature of the Sentence which the Governor expected to receive from the *Tenqua*, and which he had determined to execute with so much foresight.

The Jurubaças had informed the Secretary that the Governor had sent word that should we require water or refreshments, they would be afforded us, to which the Secretary had replied with [empty] words of grateful thanks, and since they had renewed their offers several times, the crew all besought leave of the Ambassador to have some refreshment brought, and leave being granted, on the Secretaries' coming to the galleon one day with a message from the Governor to the Ambassador to say that he had received a letter from the Government of the *Tenqua* in which the Governors stated that they acknowledged the receipt of the news of the arrival of the Ambassador and that he came as such from the new king, and therefore they would forthwith confer with the king upon this, and that he [i.e., the Governor of Nagasaki] now advised them of this good news, but not that he had order from the government to do so, and hence his Worship might rest at ease in everything, to which the Ambassador replied with courteous words of acknowledgement, and the Secretary on dismissing them before quitting the galleon, said that several times had the Governor sent to say he would afford us refreshments if we wished it, and on account of this goodwill there had arisen a Petition from the Soldiers and crew to have some;

they replied that it was so, and they would say as much to the Governor; the Ambassador then had money given them for the desired refreshment.*

In this way there was daily received the supply of provisions which was asked for; after three days' time the Jurubaças came with the water and other things, and on being asked how long it would be before a reply was received from the Court, they rejoined that it would arrive within two or three days; in the evening they returned, saying that they wished to speak with the Secretary, as they always did, and they told him that the Governor sent to tell the Ambassador that the reply had come from Hendo†—which is the Court—and that it had been brought by two governors who acted conjointly with him in Nagasaki,‡ and that the Ambassador was to go ashore to learn the reply but if he feared anything they would send it on board the galleon.

Whereon the Secretary rejoined that the Ambassadors of Kings had no cause to fear anything, as the Ambassador had clearly demonstrated, when he entered into this port without the sure certainty of ever being able to leave it, and likewise seeing on his entry castles and other fortifications being constructed which were obviously not intended for a joyous reception, and furthermore he could easily have placed himself outside of the bridge, although he did not do so since it did not conform to his reputation as Ambassador to leave without knowing the purport of the Emperor's

* According to the *Deshima Dagh-Register*, the galleons had been supplied with provisions long before this—on the 1st and 2nd of August, to be exact (see Appendix B). In passing, it may be remarked that the dates given by this Portuguese version are difficult to reconcile at times with the contemporary Dutch narrative. Where discrepancies occur, I am inclined to place greater reliance on the Dutch account, since it was kept on the spot from day to day, whilst the Portuguese relation was apparently drawn up in Goa or Macau some months later.

† Yedo—unless Hondo (the main island) is meant.

‡ According to the accounts of Kaempfer (*History of Japan*, Bk. IV, chap. ii) and Woolley (*op. cit.*), Nagasaki was ruled by two Governors only until 1687, when a third was appointed. The third Governor referred to here was probably a Commissioner of some kind.

decision and reply, especially as it was for so puissant a Monarch as he represented; hence he desired their Worships to do him the favour of sending to the galleon the declaration of the final will of the Emperor, that he might obey it in all things: the Secretary added to the Jurubaças that they might wait whilst he rendered an account to the Ambassador, which he did at once, and on his return he said that the Ambassador concurred, and with this they departed, and the old Jurubaça, being an intelligent man, showed himself impressed with the answer given.

Before two hours had elapsed the Jurubaças returned saying that the Secretaries were coming together with another person who had come from the Court* in company with the Governors aforementioned, and on their arrival the Jurubaça advanced and said it was meet that they should do obeisance to that distinguished Nobleman, as was done, and then all entered into the gallery amidst a profound silence; after the usual compliments had been exchanged the Secretary made a speech in his own language, which the Jurubaça interpreted, and [then] drew from his breast two papers, one of about a yard long written in Japanese characters, and the other a folio in our own fashion, and said that this was the despatch containing the final decision of the hon. Governors of the *Tenca*, whose purport is as follows:—

- (1) That the Emperor of Japan had executed many Portuguese and Spanish Europeans, forasmuch as despite the ancient prohibition of the preaching of the Christian Law in his Dominions, the said Portuguese and Spaniards frequently dispatched priests to Japan, thereby converting many Japanese,—and for this reason he had put them to death.
- (2) That there is certain Proof, that under pretence of propagating the Christian Faith they had taken foreign Kingdoms, and that they greatly desired to do the same with Japan, as some Europeans had confessed,† consequently the Emperor more and more considers this same Law to be criminal.

* According to the *Deshima Dagh-Register*, two Commissioners from the Court arrived on August 29th (see Appendix B).

† *E.g.*, the Spanish pilot of the *San Felipe* in 1596. "This

- (3) That the Emperor of Japan, by reason of the two paragraphs aforesaid, stringently forbids the trade, navigation and commerce of the Portuguese and Spaniards with Japan.
- (4) That although the Emperor of Japan, some years since,* proclaimed and decreed that if by any chance, any ships of the above-mentioned Kingdoms might come to Japan, all those on board would be punished with death,—yet forasmuch as the Emperor now realised that the King of Portugal had sent the Embassy to announce the recovery of his Kingdom, and since the Ambassador had entered frankly and fearlessly into the Port of Nagasaki, he did not judge the said Ambassador to be worthy of Death.
- (5) That although the King of Portugal now says that he desires the friendship of the Emperor, withal there is no reason for such a desire, however it might be otherwise if in the letter that the King of Portugal wrote to the Emperor of Japan, there had been certain proof, that from henceforth the Christian Law would never again be propagated in Japan,—the Emperor having prohibited the trade and navigation between Portugal and Japan for so many years solely on that Account, for no reason would he give ear to any other thing—albeit that the aforesaid might pass,—thus the Emperor from henceforth more and more forbids the intercourse of that Kingdom with Japan.

The aforesaid will be told to the Ambassador in detail and he will be ordered to return. On the 13th of the 7th moon of the fourth year of the Era called Xofu [Shōhō IV, 1647].

TREIXIMANO CAMIJ.	CAGONO CAMIJ.	BUGNO CAMIJ.
NANUQUINO CAMIJ.	IZUNO CAMIJ.	CAMONO CAMIJ.†

Pilot, interrogated by one of the principal Governors of Taicosama (Hideyoshi), after a survey of the map of the world, how the King of Spain, such a far-distant country, has made himself master of so many Kingdoms and Provinces, replied imprudently that the Catholic King first sent ministers of the Gospel to convert the Natives, who afterwards, uniting with the Captains of his Majesty, made the work of Conquest easy" (Letter of the Bishop of Japan, 15. xi. 1612, quoted by Murdoch, Vol. II, p. 289).

* In August, 1639 (Valentyn, *Japan*, p. 80). See also my *Subsidios para a historia dos Portuguezes no Japão, 1542-1647*.

† See Appendix A for the probable identification of these signatures.

The Ambassador having carefully considered the Vth Paragraph of the foregoing, he thought fit to put a query to the Governors, which was drawn up as follows:—

Gentlemen,

I know the whole of the contents of the Rescript of the honble: Governors of the *Tenca*, and as it leaves me no chance but to obey, reconciling myself to this final decision that the great and powerful Emperor of Japan has arrived at, namely that I must depart without the Embassy having been received, which is ill requital for the four years' tribulation I have spoken of. On my receiving the Letter from his Majesty, if I was well-informed when I had kissed his hands on taking my leave, there was told me the substance of it, without any mention of Christianity being made, and the same may be observed in the Rescript.

However, Gentlemen, I hope that your Worships will advise me, if, when I arrive in Portugal the King sends to the Emperor a[nother] letter stating that from henceforth his Vassals will never promulgate the Christian Law in Japan—if whether under these circumstances these two Princes will continue in that same friendship that formerly obtained between their Predecessors?

I beseech your Worships' answer to this, and that you may command me in anything,

From this Flagship,

GONÇALO DE SIQUEIRA DE SOUSA.

REPLY THAT THE GOVERNORS SENT BY THE 3 SECRETARIES
TO THE ABOVE EPISTLE.

The Honble: Governors send to say that they have seen the letter that your Worship sent them concerning what would happen if the King of Portugal were to send a letter to the Ambassador,—or rather to the Emperor,—etc. [sic] anent the proposition in the last paragraph of the Rescript beginning "Although the King of Portugal" etc., to which they answer that they are not able on their sole authority, to give a reply on this point; but they consider that it would not be feasible to inform the Emperor of it, because they realise that his irrevocable resolve is not to entertain any friendship with the Portuguese; and that

although they fully appreciate the great trials undergone by Your Honour during the last four years in attempting to accomplish the desired end of the Embassy,—yet withal the final decision of the Emperor was that they should leave.

On the following day came all three Secretaries, and the one who had come from the Court drew a paper from his breast which he handed to the Secretary, and said that, as has been stated above, the Emperor has strictly forbidden henceforth and for evermore, all communication whatsoever between Portugal and Japan. They accordingly intimated this to them in detail, and ordered him to depart.

The Secretary was perplexed at this statement, and so he said to the Jurubaças that it was necessary to make a further reply in order to ascertain the opinion of the Governors, what it was, and what they wished him to say about it; to which they replied that they would like to know how the Ambassador understood this last Paragraph; the Secretary seeing this move and [realising] that these were nothing but tricks and subterfuges (in view of the fact that it had already been answered as above), said "Let you tell me what you think these words to mean:" The Governors [then] said that it was the Emperor's will never again to have any friendship with the Portuguese, to which the Secretary concurred, saying the Ambassador understood it likewise; they declared they would not be satisfied with the answer unless they had it in writing, but on the Secretary offering to do so at once, they said that it would be time enough if it was done within the next two days, to which he rejoined that they could have it now or not at all, and accordingly he drew it up in a few words with which they declared themselves satisfied; yet they declared that they were accustomed to do things differently, to which it was answered "All in good time,"* and to avoid delays, it was

* "ao que se lhe respondeo mui embora . . ." The whole of this paragraph seems rather involved and obscure, but it is equally difficult to make out from the original text what both sides were driving at. Apparently the precise meaning of the fifth paragraph of the Japanese ultimatum (p. 35) and the Governor of Nagasaki's

suggested that they should draw it up in the form of a memorandum, which the Secretary would sign if they did so truthfully; and accordingly this was done: the purport of it is the following:—

I saw the statement of the honble: Governors of the *Tenca* where it is written in the 5th article of the ultimatum for the dismissal of the Hon: Ambassador, and moreover I fully understand that Portuguese will never [be allowed to] come to Japan; and in regard to what pertains to the Clause of the Honble: Governors of the *Tenca*, which declares that if sufficient proofs and testimonies were forthcoming the affair might be regarded differently, on this point I have concurred, and therefore I do not understand it otherwise.

The writing was drawn up under these terms, yet even then they showed themselves to be still dissatisfied.

On the following day they returned with a Paper in which was clearly revealed the wickedness and weakness of their minds; it ran as follows:—

We have seen the written statement of the Ambassador, dated yesterday, and we are acquainted with its contents as also with the reasoning given in regard to the Rudders and Artillery after the entry into this Port.

Although when he was asked this, he† [had] replied at considerable length, withal, the Sr: Troux Camy Sama‡ (he who now brings the Decree of the Honble: Governors of the *Tenca*) now asks whether the reasoning given above about the Rudders and artillery will be still adhered to? since he doubts the truth thereof by reason of the fear and anxiety which had prevailed among the crew, and the [sound of the] shifting of the artillery which had been observed on board the ships§; hence, as the time of

reply to the memorandum of the Ambassador on it (p. 36) were the points at issue.

† I.e., the Ambassador.

‡ Probably this Commissioner was the same as the “Treiximano Camij” who had signed the ultimatum (p. 35), and therefore a member of the Rōjū, probably Inouye Chikugo-no-kami (see also Appendices A and D).

§ See p. 28. The Ambassador's explanation as to the moving of the artillery was that the gun-carriages had to be shifted

departure is at hand, he requests a detailed response in writing,—on the 3rd of the 8th moon.

The following is the Ambassador's written reply:—

I am fully acquainted with all that Your Worships state, in the Paper which was handed to me, concerning the movement of the artillery, to which I reply that it is often placed in the part of the vessel where the men mess, and where the table things are washed up, there being much water there, and where it is the duty of the Condestavel* to see that things are cleared up (for this appertains to his office); and that [this clearing up] was the reason for the moving of the artillery; but I had not ordered such to be done, neither did I ever feel mistrustful, as was clearly shown by the confidence with which I entered, and my heart was ever calm and serene and never more so than in the days when causes for distrust arose—and if perchance there should have been some fault in the manner in which the Condestavel carried out his duties, well, seafaring men are rough, and as such let Your Worships overlook it.

With this reply,—which is here given in a different style from what they desired,—after many further questions and answers, they calmed down, saying that it would suffice, and on the Ambassador signing the document they went away with it, pretending to be satisfied, but the truth was they were afraid. On the next day the Jurubaças returned saying that the Governors ordered the Ambassador to leave on the following day, and that he was to do so in the morning, because he would find a way opened in the bridge; however, they returned in the evening to say that we must not leave until they should visit us, which would be between 8 and 9 o'clock† in the morning, as they actually did do, and bade us good-bye in the terms I have stated.

Great amazement was aroused amongst our men by the

about the decks in order to clean up the mess left by the sailors after meals. This shifting of the cannon had apparently alarmed the Japanese.

* Lit. "Constable." This officer had charge of the artillery on board Portuguese warships and his office corresponded to that of the "master-gunner" on English vessels.

† On September 4th, 1647.

vast number of vessels that were seen after the raising of the blockade, for they never had surmised there could have been so many,—the number of them was reckoned at over 2,000, many of them being rigged in red, between which the galleons passed like spies and did not set sail by strict orders from the Governor of Nagasaki; and on the Secretary asking for some craft to tow them out, it was not conceded them, but they were previously warned by the Japanese not to discharge gun or musket until clear of the island of Tacamboco, which we call the Island of Martyrs.

The Jurubaças repeated the above-mentioned orders, beseeching with much insistence that they might be observed, to which the Secretary acceded; at the same time he skilfully, yet without their wishing it, drew from them the truth [which was] that the Governor greatly feared some demonstration of feeling, and they even expressly admitted as much in the gallery of the galleon in the presence of the Ambassador; to which the Secretary answered that although the Embassy had not been received there was nothing to fear, nor would the Ambassador of the King of Portugal leave behind him a memory of his resentment, as his design was to treat of Peace,—to these words he added courteous and comforting expressions of good-will.

Furthermore, the Secretary told them that if in the open Sea we should meet with any vessels laden with gold, we would not molest them, solely because we understood they would be bound for Japan, at which they showed themselves greatly pleased, and as if they wished to see whether we would keep our word, they launched a *soma* outside the bar, which came very close alongside our flagship, that took no notice of it whatever, whilst all others that we met with sheered off from us as far as they could; finally this vessel did likewise, pursuing its course to the Harbour of Nagasaki—where they would see by experience that we had kept our word—whilst we steered for Macau.*

* Where they arrived after an exceptionally quick voyage of eleven days.

APPENDIX A.

PERSONALIA.

GONÇALO DE SIQUEIRA DE SOUSA. Sr. Frazão de Vasconcellos, of Lisbon, has been good enough to furnish me with the following particulars about this nobleman, from unpublished papers in the archives in Lisbon:—

The first mention of him occurs in 1622, when he was in command of the galleon *São Salvador*, which was one of the four vessels composing the Fleet of the Viceroy Dom Francisco da Gama, Conde da Vidigueira, on his voyage to India. On July 13, 1622 (O.S.) this squadron fell in with an Anglo-Dutch fleet of seven ships under the joint command of Jacob Dedel (D.) and Michael Green (E.), which, after a running fight of two days, sank or forced ashore three of the Portuguese ships, the remaining vessel (which I believe to have been the *São Salvador*) escaping into Mozambique. In October, 1643, we find Gonçalo de Siqueira de Sousa occupying the post of “capitão de mar e guerra” of the galleon *Nossa Senhora de Candelária*, in the fleet under Antonio Teles which was operating against the Spaniards. In a consultation of the “Conselho Ultramarino” (Overseas Council) held at the end of the same year he was recommended for the post of Ambassador to Japan, and this was approved by the King, D. João IV., on December 12, 1643. The foregoing may be usefully supplemented by the following information from a contemporary Dutch source. When, on the 6th of November, 1644, the *Santo André* was forced to put into harbour at Anjer near Batavia, she was declared “good prize” by the Governor-General Van Diemen, who, in a letter to the “Heeren XVII” in Holland, makes the following mention of the Ambassador:—

There is on board the aforementioned ship a fidalgo named GONSALO DE SEQUERJA (*sic*) DE SOUSA who is travelling to Japan as Ambassador from the new King of Portugal; he is an elderly sedate personage who resided in Manilla many years ago; his reception in Japan will be a very shabby one, as may be readily perceived by the Advices received from thence, so that this old man may think himself lucky to have lost his voyage thither. Fialho, in his conversation, opines that the Japanese will be not a little dismayed when

they learn that we have detained this personage who comes accredited to the Emperor directly from his King,—the more so since the aforesaid Ambassador gives out that he has an order to pay the debts due to the Japanese from the City of Maccouw, which amount to a very great sum; but all this is mere brag, and, on the contrary, we shall please the Japanese thereby, for their hatred of the Christians is unspeakable and the Decree of the Emperor is irrevocable.*

The *Santo André* had been detained as a reprisal for the seizure of the Dutch ship *Pauw* by the Viceroy of Goa, and when on the 6th of January, 1645, two Dutch vessels arrived from Goa with the cargo of the *Pauw* which the Viceroy had surrendered, the Portuguese galleon was released and given some men and a pilot, as well as a safe-conduct to Macau. The Fialho mentioned in the extract is the same as the Antonio Fialho Ferreira who had headed the Macaonese mission of 1642 to Dom João IV and who prior to 1637 was one of the leading men of Macau engaged in the Japan trade. He was the captain of the *Santo André*.

Gonçalo de Siqueira de Sousa died at Goa soon after the return of the galleons from Japan. He left no legitimate descendants, but two or three natural children. He was a nobleman of the Royal Household and Commander of the Order of Christ.

DOM FELIPPE MASCARENHAS. Came out to India in 1623, as commander of a fleet of three galleons and two pinks. In 1631 he was Captain of Cochin, and Geral of Ceylon, 1640–1644, and Viceroy of India, 1645–1651. Concerning his great wealth Tavernier in his *Travels* (ed. 1684, p. 87) writes:—“Never did any Viceroy depart from Goa so rich as Dom Felipe de Mascarenhas, for he had a great parcel of diamonds, all large stones, from 10 carats to 40. He showed me two when I was at Goa, one whereof weighed 57 carats, the other 67 and a half. Clean stones of an excellent water and cut after the Indian manner.” The Portuguese historian De Queiroz, in his unpublished *Historia de Ceilao* (quoted by Pieris in *Ceylon: the Portuguese Era*, vol. ii, p. 564, note 20), says that Mascarenhas “for his wealth was known amongst the Sinhalese and Hollanders as ‘Rey do Ouro’

* Translated from *De Oost-Indische Compagnie als Zeemogentheid in Azië*, Vol. II, p. 156.

('King of Gold')." One of the reasons for his appointment as Viceroy was that he might use his great wealth in aid of the very depleted Royal Exchequer at Goa, and it is very probable that he contributed a good deal to the expenses of the Embassy to Japan from his own purse.

Tavernier also gives a lengthy account* of the Embassy of Gonçalo de Siqueira de Sousa to Japan, which is one of the greatest travesties of history I have ever met with, but the following grains of wheat among the chaff are not devoid of interest:—

The most costly of these Presents [for the Shōgun and his Court] was a piece of Lignum Aloes,† otherwise call'd Wood of Calembour, four Foot in length, and two Foot in Diameter; a larger piece than which the Indies had never seen, having cost 40,000 Pardo's.‡ To this he added a great quantity of fair coral Beads of an extraordinary bigness. This is the most acceptable Present that can be sent to the Lords of Japon, which they fasten to the strings wherewith they draw their pouches together.§ With these he sent a great number of Carpets and Hangings of Cloth of Gold, Silver, and Silk, and several pieces of Tissue of Gold and Silver. 'Tis said the whole present cost the City of Goa above eight hundred thousand Pardo's which amounts to about 86666l. 13s. 4d. of English money. Besides all this the two great ships which were prepar'd for the Ambassador, carry'd one of them 50 Peeeces of Canon, and the other 35, both laden with all sorts of Commodities which are esteem'd and priz'd in Japon, amounting to about 83333l. 6s. 8d. sterling. The Equipage

* Printed in *A Collection of several Relations and Treatises singular and curious of John Baptista Tavernier Baron of Aubonne, not printed among his first six voyages*, etc., London, 1684, folios 13-15. In the extracts I have retained the spelling and punctuation of the original.

† Lign-aloes or Eagle-wood (*Aquilaria Agallocha*), in Japanese *kinankō* or *garankō*, then much used in burning for incense and greatly esteemed for its rare scent.

‡ *Pardão*, a Portuguese silver coin of fluctuating value, but then worth about three shillings of English money. (See *Hobson-Jobson*, 673-678.)

§ This is valuable, and it seems clear that either the *netsuke* (toggle) or the *ojime* (running bead) is intended. This early mention of the use of the *netsuke* has escaped the notice of Brockhaus, Joly, and other writers on the subject.

of the Ambassador was no less sumptuous. And because the Viceroy would not be thought to give any occasion of offence to the Emperour, he would not suffer one Jesuit in the Train, but only four Augustins for the Admiral, and four Jacobins for the other, Men of discretion and conduct. While I was at Goa, in the year 1648, I met with some of these Fathers, who gave an exact accompt of the Embassy.*

. and at the same time he [*i.e.*, the Governor of Nagasaki] made a present to the Embassadour, and chief of his Train, consisting of six great Cabinets, and six Coffers lacker'd with black, with Figures in Relief, intermix'd with spangles of Gold, all the Embellishments being of Massie Gold. With them were six Cabinets, and six Coffers, lacker'd with Red, Embellish'd after the same manner with silver. I saw some of them† when I was at Goa [in 1648], and I must confess I never beheld any so rare and beautiful in that kind, which made me admire the ingenious Industry of the Artists of Japon; our European imitations of their workmanship being in no way comparable to them.

LUIZ DE CARVALHO DE SOUSA. Appointed Capitão-geral of Macau in 1643. He embarked for that port on board the English ship *Bona Speranza* (captain William Gorling) belonging to Squire Courteen, the famous "interloper." This ship was attacked, in spite of its flying the Royal Standard, by a squadron of Dutch yachts in the Straits of Malacca, and was taken after a sharp fight in which the Dutch lost fourteen men killed. Luiz de Carvalho de Sousa was taken to Batavia, where he was well treated and shortly afterwards released, reaching Macau a few months later.

* Either Tavernier lies outrageously when he states this, or else he was grossly deceived by his informants. His narrative is utterly devoid of value, except for the extracts here printed. Amongst other glaring inaccuracies, he states in his *Relation* (p 14) that one of the galleons was sunk and that the Japanese executed all the "Blacks" in the flagship under the pretence that they were Indians (!).

† If this is true, it would be interesting to know what became of these works of art. Were they sent to Lisbon when the galleons sailed home in 1649, or were they kept in Goa? Or did Mascarenhas appropriate them? In any case it seems unlikely that they would be broken up, and perhaps they still exist in some forgotten nook in the Government Buildings of Lisbon or Panjim.

ANTONIO CABRAL, captain of the *São João*. In 1640 he was captain of the caravel *Santo Antonio* in the squadron of the Viceroy João de Silva Telo, Conde de Aveiras, which arrived at Goa from Lisbon in September of that year.

MATSUDAIRA CHIKUZEN-NO-KAMI. This is the "Heer van Facatta" of the Dutch accounts, so called because he was the Daimiō of Chikuzen, a province of Kiūshū the capital of which was Hakata.

TREIXIMANO CAMIJ, CAGONO CAMIJ, BUGNO CAMIJ, NANUQUINO CAMIJ, IZUNO CAMIJ, CAMONO CAMIJ. Professor M. W. de Visser of Leiden, Holland, whom I consulted over these names, identifies the first five as (probably) meant for Tajima-no-kami, Kaga-no-kami, Bungo-no-kami, Sanuki-no-kami, Idzu-no-kami; the sixth defies identification.* Father Cardim in his Account of the Embassy, after reproducing the ultimatum and the above signatures, adds by way of explanation:—"são os nomes dos seis governadores da Tenca" (these are the names of the six governors of the Tenca or *Rōjū*), and this would appear to be the case. I append a few notes on them.

Tajima-no-kami. I cannot find his name among the members of the *Rōjū* about this time. He may have been the Commissioner accompanying Inouye.

Kaga-no-kami. He was one of the signatories of the Edict of 1636 and also of the Sentence of Death passed on the four Macaonese Ambassadors and their suite, dated July 25, 1640. (See Nagaoka, p. 213.)

Bungo-no-kami. Presumably Abe Tadaaki, Bungo-no-kami, is intended. He was a member of the *Rōjū* from 1634 to 1671. It was he who, in 1630, had worsted the Shōgun Iyemitsu in a fencing-bout, much to the latter's annoyance. (See Murdoch, III, p. 64.)

Sanuki-no-kami. He was one of the signatories to the Edict restricting foreign trade in 1633, and the severer Edict issued in 1636, besides the Sentence for the Execution of the Macao Embassy in 1640. (See Nagaoka, pp. 140, 145, 213.)

* The Court title *Kamon-no-kami* 播磨頭 seems to be indicated, but I have not been able to carry the identification any further.—
EDITOR.

Matsudaira Idzu-no-kami. A signatory to the Edicts of 1636 and 1640. He had also played a prominent part in the Shimabara Rebellion of 1637-8, being commander-in-chief of the Government forces after the defeat and death of Itakura Naizen-no-kami. After the suppression of the rebellion he was sent to superintend the fortification of Nagasaki and neighbourhood, and whilst in charge of this office he organised the system of lookouts and beacons for signalling the approach of foreign ships.

INOUE CHIKUGO-NO-KAMI. This was the man who had invented the torture of the "fosse" and thereby caused the recantation of a foreign priest.* He was head of the commission for the suppression of Christianity in Japan from 1632 to about 1640, and it was he who was responsible for the demolition of the new Dutch Factory at Hirado in 1640.†

* * * * *

According to the measurements of the Japanese painting reproduced on Plate I, the dimensions of the two Portuguese galleons that reached Japan were as follows:—

SÃO JOÃO (*Capitania*): Length 26 *ken* (a *ken* is six English feet), width 7 *ken*, depth 8 *ken*; and 24 guns (this number probably means 24 on each side, or 48 in all).

SANTO ANDRÉ (*Almirante*): Length 24 *ken*, width 6 *ken*, depth 4 *ken*; and 22 guns (probably 44 in all).

According to Van Diemen's letter (see above), the *Santo André* had been built in Hamburg, so that I conclude it to have been one of the twelve ships bought in the Low Countries by Dom João IV for his Navy in 1641. Another Dutch record credits the vessel with 75 guns, but this seems unlikely. According to the Dutch, each galleon was manned with about 200 men.

* The fifty-four year old Christovão Ferreyra, on October 18, 1633.

† Because it had the date "Anno Domini 1640" on it! (See Caron's account in his *Beschrijving*, and compare Murdoch, II, p. 674.)

APPENDIX B.

TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS FROM THE MANUSCRIPT *Dagh-Register* OF THE DUTCH FACTORY AT NAGASAKI (DESHIMA).*

1647, July 26.—Beautiful wind and weather. Early in the morning there was a rumour of 2 strange ships having been sighted, . . . “whereupon everything being in readiness on the appearance of the Bonghois,† these despatched 2 vessels in which were 3 Hollanders (who were provided with Letters wherewith to be guided by), some Bonghois and Interpreters, to meet the incoming ships; outside all expectation, they found them to be 2 Portuguese galleons carrying their King’s colours; accordingly, the second Japanese vessel with one of the Interpreters rowed round their ship and conversed with their men, from whom they understood that they had been sent 4 years ago from the King of Portugal with an Ambassador to the Emperor of Japan, and that they had sailed last year from Goa *via* Macau as far as the Latitude of 28° whence they were forced by contrary winds to return by way of Jakatra, and had finally come direct from Goa, after touching at the Luchu Islands where they had watered.‡ The Interpreter returning with this news, ordered the commonality to keep it secret, which was done; and the Governor, who found the news very strange, when he was informed of it, immediately sent back the Interpreter to obtain more detailed information, whilst he also despatched a courier

* See Bibliography following the paper. As the portion dealing with the period covered by the stay of the Portuguese Embassy (folios 49–52) is too long to reproduce here, I have contented myself with making a free but full translation of certain outstanding passages only (marked by being enclosed in inverted commas) and reproducing the remainder from the original marginal headings. A page of the original, beginning with the entry for August 18, is reproduced on Plate II.

† *I.e.*, the *Bugiō*. In this case they would be the *Machi-bugiō* or Municipal Magistrates. They possessed both judicial and administrative functions.

‡ This version of the eventful Odyssey of the two galleons is a trifle garbled. For the correct sequence of events, see the official Portuguese account given in the Narrative.

to the Court and others to all the neighbouring outposts. In short, everything points to the fact that they will use every endeavour to capture the galleons by fair means or foul, to which end they have summoned vast forces which are expected here at any moment. Whether, on their appearance, things shall not turn out vastly otherwise than they expect, time alone will show. All places, especially the guardhouses, were (according to the usual custom), provided with their usual stands of pikes and hanging 'curtain walls,'* but this is more fit for bravado than a proper defence. Wherewith the day came to an end."

July 28.—Arrival of many Daimiōs with great forces of men and ships—both the galleons appear within the bay—the Cross and flags removed—several magistrates proceed on board to welcome the Portuguese—arrival of further reinforcements—the request of the Japanese† is rejected by the Portuguese.

July 29.—The Ambassador's request considered—the ship's boat taken away by the Japanese.‡

July 30.—Ostentatious preparations made for the annihilation of the Portuguese.

July 31.—Arrival of the Daimiōs of Chikuzen ("Facatta") and Higo ("Fingo")—great consternation amongst, and flight of, the townspeople.

August 1.—Demand of the Japanese again rejected—temerity of the Daimiō of Chikuzen—the Governor calms the townspeople—refreshments sent to the Ambassador's galleon.

August 2.—Departure of 2 junks with the Chinese Ambassador§—refreshments sent on board of the second galleon—

* "Gehangen schanskleeden" in the original. This is interesting because the origin of the term *Baku-fu* ("curtain government," i.e., the Shōgunal Government) was derived, in Kamakura times, from the custom of draping screens or tents of the Shōguns with hanging cloths.

† I.e., the demand to the Portuguese to deliver up their arms, etc. (see Narrative, p. 19).

‡ Narrative, p. 22.

§ This Ambassador was from Iquon (father of the celebrated Koxinga), who was then heading the resistance of the partisans of the dispossessed Ming Dynasty against the Manchus. (See my article in Vol. XXIV, p. 17.)

Singodonne and Conkeldonno* produce many pieces of artillery.

August 3.—Great confusion and disorder prevail amongst the Japanese.

August 4.—Arrival of the Daimiō of Satsuma with a strong force.

August 5.—Arrival of a junk from Tonquin.

August 6.—Written statement received from the junk. Another ship sighted at sea.

August 7.—A junk with "shaven" Chinese† arrives from Chinchiew (= Amoy).

August 8.—*Berckhout* and *Campen* arrive from Siam, the *Joncker* having lost company on the way.

August 9.—Arrival of another junk from Tonquin—*Berckhout* unladen.

August 10.—Arrival of two junks from Amoy.

August 11.—*Campen* unladen—4 junks arrive from Amoy—the *Joncker* arrives in the mouth of the bay.

August 12.—Matsudyro o Kiod^a (Matsudaira . . .?) arrives in Firando (Hirado).

August 13.—Arrival of the aforesaid Kiod^a with his suite, etc.—arrival of Chinese, with a Japanese pass, from Taiwan.

August 14.—Japanese complaint against the Portuguese.

August 15.—The mouth of the bay closed with a bridge of boats—order about shipping issued.

August 16.—*Joncker* unladen.

August 17.—The bridge of boats strengthened with towers and divers sorts of instruments of war.

August 18.—"Wind and weather as before, yet still the work of closing up the Bay goes forward by night and day, whilst the Portuguese passively behold it without apparently making any defensive preparations. About 8 o'clock the Bonghois went on board the fly-boat *Berckhout* in order to search through

* I cannot identify these names.

† I.e., Chinese who had submitted to the Manchus and shaved their heads in accordance with the fashion of the conquerors.

all chests, etc., after the usual manner. After having repaired thither in our company and examined all books and papers on hand, they returned in good humour, taking the small-arms with them in accordance with the usual procedure, saying that in compliance with the Governor's order they would leave the guns and ammunition on board in view of the present multifarious anxieties, whereto they had authority to use their discretion. Shortly afterwards the interpreters returned from the Governor's house, saying that his Honour asked us to excuse him, since it was not possible with all this hurly-burly to follow the usual routine,—the which we gladly did and sent our thanks once more to his Honour for his courtesy."

August 19.—"Wind and weather as before. The Interpreter made his appearance very early and announced that the fact of our small-arms being taken from the ship yesterday had apparently annoyed the Governor, as much as to say that the same should have been left on board, whereon [we?] promised, whether on or off the ship, to fulfil his Honour's commands and desires. Likewise they went on board the flyboat *Campen* to examine all the chests and papers, which was duly performed in good form, whilst after they had made a list of the small-arms they left them on board without placing them under seal, solely in the hope that we will allow ourselves to be employed against the Portuguese, which we hope and trust we shall be able to avoid, without giving any offence."*

August 20.—"Wind and weather, likewise visit to the flyboat *Joncker* and the remaining on board of the small-arms therein, as before; meanwhile they unceasingly continue in their endeavours to have everything ready and prepared against the expected arrival of the Commissioners."

August 21.—"Wind and weather as before. To-day it was resolved to let our ships lie in such a manner as to be under the protection of his Majesty of Japan and the eye of the Governor of this place, but without requiring them to be

* The Dutch were evidently quite determined not to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for the Japanese! Perhaps the odium they had incurred in Europe in consequence of their assisting in the repression of the Shimabara Rebellion in 1637-8 may have had something to do with their reluctance to aid the Japanese in attacking the Portuguese on this occasion.

responsible for their defence, and furthermore that we would not assist the Japanese against the Portuguese, despite that the former would gladly have had us do so by reason of sparing their own men; likewise we understood that the Commissioner Zickingod° and the Governor Gompatsdono [*i.e.*, Inouye Chikugo-no-kami and the other Governor of Nagasaki] are expected to arrive here within 2 or 3 days, bringing with them the Decision of his Majesty; the Portuguese were informed of this by the Secretary, and they showed their joy at the receipt of this news by cheering and sounding their trumpets. Towards the evening we were secretly informed by a certain person that the Portuguese will be granted freedom to leave in peace; in short, we now see with our own eyes of what stuff the Japanese are made, for they show themselves to be so terrified by 2 ships, notwithstanding they had been preparing for them for the last 3 years and had assembled all the might of the Nine and Four Provinces of Quoesiouw [Kiūshū] and Cikoko [Shikoku], that they now, out of fear of unpleasant consequences, are prepared to grant them permission to leave."

August 22 and 23.—"Weather, and for the most part wind, as before, but the latter more northerly. Nothing of importance occurred."

August 24.—Wind variable.

August 25.—"Mild weather. In the morning the wind easterly, later from the S.W. with showers of rain. As yet the Emissaries from the Court are not resolved deliberately to carry out that plan, because everything is so well in hand before their arrival that little disturbance is anticipated in connection with the freedom [to leave] obtained [by the Portuguese].* And we were told as the truth (whether it be plausible or not) that in the year '40 none of the Portuguese (at least so reported the Courier from the Court who arrived about 2 hours afterwards*) had been executed, but had all been set free again.† It is also rumoured that the Portuguese are likely to attain their desire, if not in Nagasaki, then in Hirado or even Jobiko,‡ for it is now said that they

* I am aware of the inadequacy of this translation, but the Dutch defeats me.

† Very interesting, but of course wildly untrue!

‡ Apparently Yobuko 呼子, near Nagoya in Hizen.

cannot harm Japan if they confine themselves to trading, but all this is difficult to believe, but much more likely, according to the common opinion, on certain considerations.

Whereas the Ambassador of the new King of Portugal has failed to appear, and furthermore 5 or 6 galleons (which might cause great trouble) are shortly expected to fetch the answer, in order to prevent future complications, it has been decided not to proceed rigorously with them this time, but (with threats of severe penalties in the event of their return) to let them leave in peace."

August 26.—Arrival of a Cochin-Chinese junk.

August 27.—Arrival of another junk.

August 28.—Chinese deerskins brought for view on the Island (Deshima)—two junks arrive from Amoy—news received of the capture of Cavita* in the Manillas.

August 29.—Arrival of the Commissioner† and the Governor Gompatsdono—the Emperor's mandate sent to the Portuguese—appearance of the yacht *De Prins* with the Heer Frederick Coyett‡ on board.

August 30.—Inefficient war preparations of the Japanese—the Commissioners go to greet Gompatsdono.

September 1.—Representations of the Governors—arrival of a Nankin junk.

September 2.—The Governor and the Daimiō of Chikuzen pay a visit to Deshima.

* Cavité, in the Philippines, was the fort and port of Manila and had been unsuccessfully attacked by a Dutch expedition under Martin Gerritsen Vries (who had made a celebrated voyage to Yezo and the Kuriles in 1643 in search of the fabled "Gold and Silver Islands") in June, 1647, but he died a few months later and the expedition was a complete failure.

† According to the Japanese account given by Woolley (see Appendix D), the Commissioner, Inouye Chikugo-no-kami, arrived from Yedo on the 28th.

‡ Frederick Coyett was chief of the Deshima Factory 1647-8 and 1652-3. He was appointed Governor of Formosa in 1656 and was made the scapegoat for the loss of this island to the Chinese in 1662 (see my article in Vol. XXIV, where he was by inadvertence called *Jakob* Coyett).

September 3.—Their Letter of credit returned to the Portuguese—the yacht *De Prins* arrives in the harbour.

September 4.—The Governors sail outside, in order to settle matters properly—the Portuguese ordered to leave

APPENDIX C.

TRANSLATION OF VALENTYN, *Byzondere Zaaken over Japan*,
IN *Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indien*, Deel V, Pages 88-9.

THE 26th inst. there appeared two Portuguese galleons with an Ambassador from the King of Portugal to the Emperor of Japan, which was at once made known to the Court, and created [here] such an alarm that in a few days all the neighbouring daimios with many thousands of soldiers came pouring in, enticing with fair words the Portuguese (who to begin with lay at anchor before the bay) to come within. Hereon many craft were brought up and fitted out as fireships, whilst the bay was closed by means of a ships-bridge whereon stood whole towers. Meanwhile the Portuguese, seeing what they were in for, prepared themselves for resistance and refused to let more than three or four Japanese at a time come on board their ships; and, on pretence that they came as ambassadors and not as merchants, refused to surrender their powder, shot, rudders, etc., whereon all the women and children, together with the most valuable goods, were hurried off to the mountains for safety; albeit the attack was postponed until receipt of further orders from the Court; however, they gave refreshments in abundance to the two ships, each vessel being mann'd with about 200 men. Whilst this universal consternation prevailed, everyone believed that the unfortunate Portuguese would shortly be massacred, and the Daimio of Facatta* was so valiant that he offered, without the help of any other forces, to undertake the whole battle with his samurai alone, the first division of these amounting to some 40,000 men, besides another body of 20,000 which he held in reserve for their support. Nevertheless, all these preparations (as great as if the whole world was to be conquered)

* Matsudaira Chikuzen-no-Kami (see Appendix A).

dwindled to nothing with the arrival of a Commissioner, since he brought an order from the Court whereby his Majesty granted the Portuguese their lives (solely because this embassy appeared on behalf of the new King of Portugal), albeit they otherwise according to the laws of the land ought to suffer death, which danger they would escape if they would stay away in future. Thereupon their Letters of Credence were sent on board again, and (without at first being allowed to hoist sail) they were towed outside on the 4th of September.

APPENDIX D.

The following is quoted from W. A. Woolley's *Historical Notes on Nagasaki* in *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan* Vol. IX, Part II, pp. 139-140, Tōkiō, 1881, reprinted 1905.

ON July 26th, 1647, two Portuguese vessels anchored off YUWŌ-JIMA with Ambassadors from GOA, and asked permission to trade. On the 28th they entered the harbour and anchored off MINAGI. They refused to give up their arms and ammunition, saying that they intended to return after they had presented their petition. On the 30th, MATSUDAIRA CHIKUZEN no KAMI arrived; he was succeeded by the Karō and soldiers of most of the daimiōs in KIUSHIU. In consultation with the Governor, it was decided that a bridge of boats should be stretched across the harbour from ŌGAMI to MEGAMI to prevent the ships escaping. For the purpose of terrifying the foreigners, SAWADA KUNAIZAYEMON, a retainer of ŌMURA and a skilled horseman, is said to have appeared on this bridge on a powerful chestnut horse in full armour, brandishing a spear.* In the course of a month troops from the various daimiates 30,433 strong, and sailors to the number of 19,795 assembled at Nagasaki and took up positions on the islands at the entrance of the harbour, on both shores of the harbour, and at FUKAHŌRI.† Never before in Japan had such an array of men

* There is no mention of this piece of bravado in either the Dutch or Portuguese accounts, so that if it really took place it does not seem to have had its intended effect!

† Kaempfer (Bk. IV, ch. 1) describes Fukahori as "a pleasant village, situate to the S.W. [of Nagasaki] about five Japanese water leagues, or two small german miles from the town; it hath a small Fort or Castle the residence of a Bugio," etc.

gathered together to guard their country against foreigners. All the roads, too, leading to Nagasaki were guarded. On the 28th August* INOUE CHIKUGO no KAMI and the Governor arrived from YEDO, and presented MATSUDAIRA with a letter from the Government recommending a lenient policy. The ships were, accordingly, suffered to leave on September 4th, and after a few days the troops dispersed.

APPENDIX E.

TRANSLATION† OF THE MINUTES OF THE *Conselho Ultramarino* RELATING TO THE APPOINTMENT OF THE AMBASSADOR.

*Concerning the appointment of the Ambassadors
to Japan, who are to leave immediately
in these two Vessels.*

IN the Consultation presented by this Council to YOUR MAJESTY on the 3rd inst. concerning whether it would be convenient for the two ships that YOUR MAJESTY has ordered to be prepared for the China Voyage, to sail direct to Macau, mention was made of the fact that it would appear to be an excellent thing for YOUR MAJESTY to send an Ambassador to the King of Japan,—care being taken to select a man fitted by character and capacity for that post, forasmuch as it is understood that he would be better received by that Monarch if he went thither directly from here, than if he was sent by the Viceroy of India; because, seeing thereby that YOUR MAJESTY placed such a value on his friendship, the way would be opened to a friendly and profitable intercourse from which we could justly hope to draw great riches and wealth; and since YOUR MAJESTY was pleased to assent to the proposition put forward in the aforesaid Consultation, it appeared good to the Council that they should nominate to YOUR MAJESTY some capable subjects for this Embassy, and accordingly they nominate in the first place—

* On the 29th, according to the *Dagh-Register* (see Appendix B).

† From the original copy sent me from Lisbon by Sr. Frazão de Vasconcellos.

Gonçalo de Siqueira de Sousa, gentleman of YOUR MAJESTY'S Household, who has served in India many years, and went there as Captain of a galleon in the Fleet of the Conde de Vidigueira, and who has also served with satisfaction in this Kingdom [*i.e.*, Portugal].

In the second place—*Theodozio de Oliveira Leite*, of the Habit of Santhiago, soldier of India, where he was employed as Captain of various ships, and subsequently as *Capitão-de-mar-e-guerra* under the Marquis of Montalvão in Brazil, and who has served in the same capacity in former Fleets, and as *Almirante* in the Fleet which left under the command of Cosmo do Couto. And the Marquis* further adds that, in his opinion, Theodozio de Oliveira is a very fit and proper person for this Embassy, inasmuch as he can conduct this voyage with both brevity and facility.

And in the third place—Captain *Francisco Barroso*, Knight of the Habit of Christ and *Capitão-de-mar-e-guerra*, a person of much ability and many services, who will readily undertake this voyage.

And it appeared to the Council that on no condition whatsoever should this Embassy be sent from India, because, as in the opinion of the Japanese all the *moradores* of India are merchants, they would not respect them, but despise or ignore them; and further, since the Dutch have a good understanding with the Japanese, they would at once give out that the Embassy did not really come from the King of Portugal, but only from the Viceroy of India; whereas, if the Embassy proceeds straight to China, it will gain greatly in prestige; and it is imperative that the Embassy should proceed at once in these two ships, because its departure will give rise to two things, both of great importance to the Service of YOUR MAJESTY and of the Kingdom and to the *moradores* of the City of Macau and of the other towns of India; the first, the re-assurance of the durability of YOUR MAJESTY'S happy Restoration of these your Kingdoms, that the *moradores* of the City of Macau will feel, when they see that YOUR MAJESTY is so securely and firmly established as to be able to send his Ambassadors to such remote parts in order to succour and protect them; and the second, that if the friendship of

* *I.e.*, the Marquis de Montalvão, President of the *Conselho Ultramarino*.

this King leads to the re-opening of the trade with Japan, then this Kingdom of Portugal and its Indian Dependencies will be able to derive therefrom as great a supply of riches and wealth as they formerly did; and so much the less will the Dutch and Castilians* have, who now avail themselves of this profitable commerce.

And it seems good to represent to YOUR MAJESTY that the Nomination that this Council makes of these persons for this Embassy, is made with consideration of the fact that (having regard to YOUR MAJESTY's Service) some one of them should go who will be the most able to make ready to sail in these ships, and, in connection with the question of Costs, YOUR MAJESTY should take special care to write to the City of Macau telling them to favour this Embassy and to defray its expenses from their own Account, since it goes to Japan with the authority that is requisite and it is understood that it is necessary for them.

In Lisbon, 9th December, 1643.

(Signed) The Marquis of MONTALVÃO.
JORGE DE CASTILHO.
JORGE DE ALBUQUERQUE.
JOÃO DELGADO FIGUEIRA.

(In the margin) I nominate for this Embassy Captain Gonçalo de Siqueira de Sousa. Lisbon, 12th December, 1643.

THE KING.

* This is a mistake. The Spaniards had been expelled from Japan in 1625.

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(2) Dutch—

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Batavias Briefboek, lopende van 3.i.1647 tot 15.xii.1647.

Instructie voor den Opperhoofden, enz., Batavia, 2.v.1647.

N.B.—The above three documents are included in *Brieven en Papieren overgecomen van O. Indië in het Jaar 1648*, Book II, preserved in the Rijksarchief at The Hague, no. 1065.

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(2) *Dutch*—

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ADDENDUM.

(The following additional notes are based on information which reached me from Lisbon too late for them to be included in their proper place in Appendix A.)

ANTONIO DE GOUVEIA DO VALE. "Son of Gaspar do Vale, native of Lisbon, Knight of the King's Household, and Member of the Order of Christ. He served the Crown of Portugal nineteen years, first as soldier and captain of infantry, and subsequently as captain of caravels in the Royal Navy; served in the expedition to Bahia, and in the Spanish Indies, in recognition of which he was raised from the rank of Gentleman of the Bedchamber to Knight of the Second Class, with the Habit of the Order of Christ and an annuity of sixty milreis and the captaincy of a galleon of the Royal Navy. He went to India in 1640, and despite his great age rendered many services during six years in the fleets and the war against the Dutch." Amongst his papers in the Archives at Lisbon is a certificate signed by Gonçalo de Siqueira de Sousa relating the services rendered by him as captain of the *Santo André* during the blockade of the galleons in Nagasaki harbour in August, 1647, where he voted in the Council against acceding to the Governor of Nagasaki's demand to yield up their arms.

ANTONIO FIALHO FERREIRA. One of the leading men of Macau who had great commercial interests in Japan in the third decade of the seventeenth century. Owing to disputes with his fellow-merchants, he was forced to leave Macau about 1637 and journeyed to Europe *viâ* India, Persia and Spain. Being in Lisbon when João IV was proclaimed King, he was sent by the latter to Macau to proclaim the new monarch. This he successfully accomplished and was entrusted by the Senate and people of Macau with a mission to Dom João to urge upon him the importance of re-opening the trade with Japan (see Introduction). He appears to have been chiefly instrumental in bringing about the formation of the Embassy, and was appointed captain of the *Santo André* on the outward voyage in 1644. He went

to Goa with the galleons in 1645 and either died there or was superseded as Captain of the Squadron by Antonio Cabral. Among his papers in the Lisbon Archives is the following concerning the preparations for the Embassy to Japan:—

ADVICES OF SOME NECESSARY MATTERS FOR THE EMBASSY
TO JAPAN.

Firstly, the Letter which His Majesty is to send to the Emperor of Japan must be drawn up on a sheet of parchment, white and thin, measuring $2\frac{1}{2}$ spans broad by 2 in length; this must be gilded on the outside with decorations which resemble stars, whose diameters should be 3 fingers' breadths, also gilded like other different designs; this parchment being doubled into 2 folds one on the other, so that the size of the Letter when folded is nearly one span long and a little less in breadth, in the middle of the space thus provided, instead of a superscription, shall be placed the arms of Portugal surmounted by its crown likewise gilded. And in order to make certain of these details, which are of importance, I will draw a sketch of the design and give it to the official who is to execute it.

When the Letter is made and folded, it must be provided with a piece of gilded satin like a handkerchief to cover it, and if this covering or satin handkerchief is embroidered it will command still further respect.

Of the same width as this Letter must be made a casket of gold moulded with fancy work and lined on the inside with plain crimson satin, so that this lining may be seen through the carving of the casket, which will not be a very costly matter, including the key with which it is to go locked.

The purport of the Letter must be to give the King of Japan to understand that His Majesty is restored to his Kingdom of Portugal that belongs to him by legitimate succession as direct descendant of the most serene kings of old, his ancestors and predecessors; the which kingdom has been forcibly usurped by the King of Castile [*i.e.*, Spain] for many years, until the Portuguese, infuriated with his tyrannical government, shook off their allegiance to him and unanimously proclaimed our Lord the King; and for greater proof thereof can be sent a copy of the

printed Proclamation which was made by the Secretary of State, Antonio Paez Viegua, translated into Japanese, which may be done here by one of the Fathers of the Company*; and that now His Majesty, as true King and Father of his Portuguese vassals, wishes to promote their welfare by all means in his power, including those who live so far away from his own eyes, like the inhabitants of the City of Macau, forasmuch as they loyally gave him their allegiance without waiting for him to subdue them by force of arms; and that His Majesty being now informed of the trade that the Kingdom of Japan drove with the Portuguese for more than eighty years until they offended the Emperor by some oversights, so that that Monarch forbade them to trade or come to his Dominions,—so now His Majesty wishes to repair this break and hereby offers his friendship and brotherly love, so that henceforth it may be kept and cherished as is just. Hence he has resolved to send from this Kingdom and Court an Ambassador, who is Dom† Gonçalo de Siqueira, nobleman of his Household, to whom will be given full credit and powers to accommodate this matter, for the due and entire fulfilment of which His Majesty pledges his Royal Word.

Now, although I believe that the above should be the substance of the Letter (albeit at greater or less length and with better eloquence), yet withal I do not rely upon it entirely, and I suggest that it would be a good thing to communicate it to some Fathers of the Company, if perchance there are some here from Japan; or it will be equally good if His Majesty signs the Letter in blank and entrusts the writing of it to the City of Macau, forasmuch as they can make it as the opportunities of time will show, and it will be executed with all loyalty. There must go a written order from the Coleitor which prohibits, under pain of ecclesiastical penalties, Fathers from entering Japan, whether openly or secretly, by whatever way it may be, and if this order could come from the Nuncio‡ it will be of greater effect.

The Ambassador must take an order from His Majesty

* *Companhia de Jesus*—Jesuits.

† The “Dom” must be a slip, as nowhere else is he given this title.

‡ The Papal Legate in Lisbon.

which obliges him to follow the Instruction, or Rescript, which the City of Macau gives to him, as well in the manner of speaking in the Embassy as in the consideration and authority of his person, because among that nation many things are disapproved of which would not be held irregular amongst us, such as not leaving his house except to visit the King or his Ministers, taking no notice of women, not asking for any merchandise or golden coins and other valuable baubles which are worth buying,—besides which many other punctilious discriminations which are customary with that nation and of which information will be given beforehand.

Although this is not the time to speak of the expenses of this Embassy, which is of the noblest that has ever been made in the East and for the richest and most presumptuous King in the Orient, because withal it should not go destitute of any things which come from our native land, I will mention some here which will not be very expensive:—

(1) A complete stand of arms well engraved—and if they can be gilded, so much the better.

(2) A broad-bladed sword, of a larger size than the ordinary, well mounted, excellently polished, and as valuable as possible.

(3) A half-length portrait of our Lord the King, on a painted metal panel measuring a hand's span, with border of gold, and on the other part of the panel our Lady the Queen holding the Prince by the hand.

(4) Two or four pieces of coral of extraordinary size. §

And finally some curiosity which they have never seen or heard of, because that King, lord as he is of so many mountains of silver, more esteems strange curiosities than any kind of riches.

To God above, who it is disposes of us all.—[*Bibliotheca Nacional de Lisboa, Arquivo de Marinha e Ultramar—Lembretes* (=Memoranda), 1642-1645.]

ANTONIO CABRAL. Knight of the Order of Santiago. Granted the rank of Gentleman of the Royal Household in honour of the services rendered by him in India, where he had been captain of a ship in the Fleet which the

Viceroy Dom Felipe de Mascarenhas took to Ceylon, and subsequently Captain-Major of the two galleons sent to Japan. On November 28, 1641, he was granted a pension of \$40 as a commander of the Order of Santiago for his services in the Fleets. The diploma refers to a fight in which he received three bullet wounds in defending his ship against four enemy vessels, and states that he was once wounded nearly to death in a fight with a Turkish ship. He had also served with distinction in Brazilian and European waters.

A FURTHER NOTE ON THE GALLEONS.

(i) "*São João*," or "*São João Baptista*," had been built at Oporto in 1642, by Paulo Meireles Pacheco, and went to India in March, 1644, under the command of Antonio Cabral. After the voyage to Japan in 1647, it returned to Portugal in 1649 and was destroyed in a fight with the Dutch on May 3, 1654. [See my article in the "*Mariner's Mirror*," July, 1928, for further details.]

(ii) "*Santo André*" was built in Hamburg, and bought for the Portuguese Navy in 1641. The Dutch records state it to have been a well-built vessel.

(iii) "*Santo Antonio de Aveiro*": date of construction not known, but it was evidently an old ship, as a letter from Antonio Fialho in the Lisbon Archives states that it leaked badly on the voyage out to India in 1644, and nearly foundered off the Cape Verde Islands. When the "*Santo André*" and "*Santo Antonio de Aveiro*" left Lisbon in February, 1644, they had on board the following cargo:—"fifty pipes of wine, 800 vessels of oil, 300 hats, 104 ivory elephants' teeth and 549 lbs. of coral." On arrival at Macau this was to be sold for the best prices possible, in the presence of Antonio Fialho and the public notaries, and from the money thus obtained they were to buy as much copper as they could, suitable for the casting of artillery "of which there is a great lack in this Kingdom." It must be remembered that, prior to 1640, Macau was famous for the excellence of its bronze and copper cannon cast from copper imported from Japan, and the lack of this copper was not the least of the losses suffered in the rupture of the Japan trade.

